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IV.
JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction in this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(f). The Utah Court of
Appeals now has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78A-4-103(2)(e).
V.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Ramon Juma, having entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of
tvf

controlled substance with intent to distribute, a 3 degree felony, and having
reserved his right to appeal the trial court's denial on his motion to suppress
evidence (Record at 65-75), asserts the following issues on appeal:
1.

Whether the trial court erred when it ruled that there was
reasonable articulable suspicion to support the stop and
detention of Juma. (Record, 22-43, 65-75, 107)
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Standard of Review: Mr. Juma argues that the trial court erred by
denying his Motion to Suppress. On review of both criminal and civil
proceedings, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162,
1172 (Utah 1988); see also, State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26, % 22, 135 P.3d 864
(defining a factual finding). "We review the trial court's ruling on a motion
to suppress for correctness, without deference to the trial court's application
of the law to the facts." Layton City v. Oliver, 2006 UT App 244,f11, 139
P.3d 281 (citing State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, \ 15, 103 P.3d 699).
2.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that the detention of
Juma was Not Excessive or Beyond the Scope of the Original
Stop. (Record, 22-43, 65-75, 107).

Standard of Review: Mr. Juma argues that the trial court erred by
denying his Motion to Suppress. On review of both criminal and civil
proceedings, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162,
1172 (Utah 1988); see also, State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26,122, 135 P.3d 864
(defining a factual finding). "We review the trial court's ruling on a motion
to suppress for correctness, without deference to the trial court's application
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of the law to the facts." Layton City v. Oliver, 2006 UT App 244, f 11, 139
P.3d 281 (citing State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 15, 103P.3d699).
3.

Whether the trial court erred in denying the Motion to Suppress
under circumstances where any basis in fact for reasonable
articulable suspicion of criminal activity had dissipated.
(Record, 22-43, 65-75, 107).

Standard of Review: Mr. Juma argues that the trial court erred by
denying his Motion to Suppress. On review of both criminal and civil
proceedings, the appellate court accepts the trial courts findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162,
1172 (Utah 1988); see also, State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26, f 22, 135 P.3d 864
(defining a factual finding). MWe review the trial court's ruling on a motion
to suppress for correctness, without deference to the trial court's application
of the law to the facts." Layton City v. Oliver, 2006 UT App 244, f 11, 139
P.3d 281 (citing State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 15, 103 P.3d 699).
4.

Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying the
Motion to Suppress Evidence where Trooper Bowles conducted
a search of the interior of the vehicle and the closed containers
therein, absent exigent circumstances, without first seeking and
obtaining a search warrant, based on Probable Cause, in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

violation of both the Fourth Amendment and Article I Section
14 of the Utah Constitution. (Record, 22-43, 65-75, 107).
Standard of Review: Mr. Juma argues that the trial court erred by
denying his Motion to Suppress. On review of both criminal and civil
proceedings, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162,
1172 (Utah 1988); see also, State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26,122, 135 P.3d 864
(defining a factual finding). "We review the trial court's ruling on a motion
to suppress for correctness, without deference to the trial court's application
of the law to the facts." Layton City v. Oliver, 2006 UT App 244,1f 11, 139
P.3d 281 (citing State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,115, 103 P.3d 699).

VI.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 14
STATUTES:
UCA § 41-6a-904
UCA § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii)
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UCA § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
UCA §77-7-15
UCA § 78A-3-102(3)(f)
UCA §78A-4-103(2)G).
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VIL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Memorandum Decision and final Order of
the Sixth Judicial District Court for the State of Utah, Sevier County,
Richfield Department, the Hon. Wallace A. Lee, Judge, denying Defendant
Ramon Juma's Motion to Suppress Evidence. (Record, 65-75).
Juma had sought the exclusion of all evidence for reason that the
seizure of his person and vehicle, detention, and subsequent search and
arrest were unlawful, and violated his Constitutional rights under both the
Fourth Amendment and under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Juma argued that the motor vehicle stop by police was without any
reasonable articulable suspicion of any violation of traffic, equipment or
other laws; that his detention by police after the stop exceeded the scope of
the original stop; that any reasonable suspicion dissipated upon the police
issuing a warning citation to the driver of the vehicle; and that the additional
detention by police to conduct a drug dog sniff of the vehicle did not
establish sufficient probable cause to permit the police to search the vehicle
without first obtaining a search warrant, arguing that no exigent
circumstances existed to justify the warrantless search.
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B.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL
COURT
Defendant/Appellant Ramon Juma was arrested on March 31, 2009 in
Sevier County, Utah and charged by Information with one count of
possession of a controlled substance, to wit: more than one pound but less
than 100 pounds of marijuana, with intent to distribute, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §58-37-8(l)(a)(iii), and one count of possession of a controlled
substance, cocaine, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), on
April 3, 2009.
Upon bind over after conducting a Preliminary Hearing on August 11,
2009, Juma Moved to Suppress the Evidence against him. A Suppression
Evidentiary Hearing was held on September 22, 2009, and the issues were
briefed by all parties. The trial court denied Juma's Motion to Suppress in
its Memorandum Decision dated March 4, 2010.
After the trial court denied the Motion to Suppress Evidence, Juma
entered a Conditional Guilty Plea on June 15, 2010, to the single count of
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, reserving his right to
appeal the trial court's denial of the Motion to Suppress; the remaining count
of possession of cocaine was dismissed. Juma waived time for sentencing,
was sentenced to 0 - 5 years at the Utah State Prison; however, the sentence
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was stayed by the trial court while Juma appeals the denial of his
suppression Motion, and he remains free on an appeal bond and other
conditions imposed by the trial court.
Juma timely filed his Notice of Appeal on June 15, 2010 with the
District Court in Richfield.

C.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On March 31, 2009, at about 9:30 a.m., Trooper Nick Bowles of
the Utah Highway Patrol was conducting traffic patrol along
Interstate 70 in Sevier County, when he observed a black
Chevrolet sedan enter the freeway behind a semi-trailer, both going
eastbound. Both the semi and the Chevy remained in the right
(outside) lane as they passed several Utah Department of
Transportation (UDOT) maintenance vehicles along the outside
shoulder, which were not in or obstructing any lanes of traffic.
(Record at 66; Record at 106, Preliminary Hearing Transcript, pp.
13-16; Record at 107, Suppression Hearing Transcript, pp. 14, 37).

2.

Alhough the adjacent left lane on the freeway was unoccupied,
neither the semi, nor the Chevy, moved over or changed lanes as
each approached and then passed the UDOT vehicles. (Record at
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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66; Record 106, Preliminary Hearing Transcript, p. 18; Record at
107, Suppression Hearing Transcript, p. 14).
3.

The UDOT vehicles were displaying flashing "amber" or
commonly known as yellow lights; none of the stopped vehicles
displayed any lighted or flashing red, white or blue lights, alone or
in any combination. (Record at 106, pp. 16-18; Record at 107, p.
12).

4.

When Trooper Bowles observed the semi and the black Chevy
both pass the UDOT crew without changing lanes, he decided to
stop the black Chevy with out-of-state license plates. Trooper
Bowies' patrol car was equipped with video/audio recording
devices, and a copy of the dash-cam video was admitted as
evidence at the time of the Suppression Hearing, September 22,
2009. (Record at 106, p. 18-19; Record at 107, pp. 30-31).

5.

Trooper Bowles testified at both the Preliminary Hearing and the
Suppression Hearing that the only reason he stopped the black
Chevy was for failing to change lanes into the unoccupied left lane,
as the vehicle approached and passed the UDOT crew. (Record at
106, p. 5; Record at 107, p. 11).
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6.

Bowles testified that he "felt it was dangerous to the safety of the
UDOT workers for the black Chevrolet not to move over as it
passed." (Record at 67; Record at 106, p. 5; Record at 107, p. 15).

7.

The driver of the Chevy, Diamond Flynn, produced a Michigan ID
card, but admitted she had no current driver's license; the
passenger, Defendant Ramon Juma, produced his Kansas driver's
license and his vehicle contract rental agreement. (Record at 68;
Record at 106, pp. 6-7; Record at 107, p. 18).

8.

Trooper Bowles required the driver, Flynn, to sit with him in his
patrol cruiser, while he ran standard background checks on both
Flynn and Juma. During the course of the next 18 minutes,
Trooper Bowles received information verifying that neither Flynn
nor Juma have any outstanding warrants, that their identification
and license information is all correct, and that the rental vehicle
information is all correct. He also received dispatch information
that Juma had prior arrests in other states in the past several years
for DUI and for drug possession; however, Juma had only been
convicted of a DUI and all other charges had been dismissed prior
to this Utah investigation. (Record at 106, p. 22; Record at 107,
pp. 53-54).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Trooper Bowles then gave Flynn a written warning notice for
driving without a license, gave her back her ID card, and she began
exiting the patrol car to leave; at that point, Trooper Bowles asked
her if he could ask more questions, and then he asked to search the
vehicle. (Record at 68; Record at 106, pp. 26-29; Record at 107,
pp. 56-57).
Flynn refused this request and advised that Juma was the car's
actual renter. Bowles then asked Juma if he could search, and Juma
also declined. (Record at 68; Record at 106, pp. 28-29; Record at
107, p. 57).
At this point in time, Bowles decided to deploy his canine, which
had been with him in the patrol car the entire time. Both Flynn and
Juma were outside the vehicle, along side the shoulder of the
freeway, and could not hide, destroy, or otherwise interfere with
any of the potential evidence in the car. (Record at 106, pp. 9-10;
Record at 107, p. 57).
Based on the dog's actions while sniffing the car, Trooper Bowles
declared that the dog had alerted and he immediately began
searching the interior of the black Chevy, where he subsequently
discovered about 33 pounds of marijuana inside one or more
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closed containers. When Juma was arrested and transported to jail,
a tiny amount of cocaine was discovered in his pocket. (Record at
106, p. 10-11).
13.

Juma was charged by Information with Count I, Possession of
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute (marijuana) and
Count II, Possession of Controlled Substance (cocaine), both Third
Degree Felonies. (Record at 3).

14.

Defendant filed a Motion and Memorandum to Suppress
Evidence on August 11, 2009 (Record at 22-36), and a
Supplemental Memorandum on September 22, 2009 (Record at 3743). The Court held an Evidentiary Hearing in the matter on
September 22, 2009 (Record at 106), the State filed its
Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Suppress on
November 17, 2009 (Record at 47-62), and the District Court
issued its Memorandum Decision denying Defendant's Motion to
Suppress, on March 4, 2010 (Record at 65-75).

15.

On June 15, 2010, Defendant Juma entered into a Conditional
guilty plea for Count I, reserving the right to appeal, and upon the
State's motion, Count II was dismissed. (Record at 85-86).
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16.

Juma timely filed his Notice of Appeal at the District Court in
Richfield on June 15, 2010 (Record at 89-90); The District Court
granted Juma's Motion for Stay of Sentence Pending Appeal, and
Juma remains free on an appeal bond and other restrictions
imposed by the District Court (Record at 91-92).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court erred as a matter of law, in not granting the

defendant's motion to suppress the evidence in this case, where under the
totality of the circumstances and facts, the law requires exclusion of
evidence where,
I.

the police lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to
stop the defendant's car and detain him and his driver;

II.

the duration of the stop was excessive, and beyond the
scope of the original stop;

III.

any reasonable articulable suspicion had dissipated;
and where

IV.

the police used a dog sniff alert to claim probable
cause to search the car, then searched the car without
obtaining a search warrant, under conditions that did
not amount to exigent circumstances.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN
IT DENIED MR. JUMA'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE ON
GROUNDS OF THE LACK OF REASONABLE SUSPICION TO
STOP AND DETAIN DEFENDANT; ON GROUNDS OF EXCESSIVE
DETENTION OF THE DEFENDANT; ON GROUNDS OF THE
DISSAPATION OF ANY REASONABLE SUSPICION; ON
GROUNDS OF VIOLATING JUMA'S DUE PROCESS AND OTHER
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE; ON GROUNDS OF LACK OF PROBABLE
CAUSE WITHOUT EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES; ON GROUNDS
OF UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHOUT A
WARRANT.

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT
RULED THAT TROOPER BOWLES HAD REASONABLE
SUSPICION TO STOP AND DETAIN THE VEHICLE
A.

Marshaling of Facts:
In its Memorandum Decision denying Defendant's Motion to

Suppress Evidence, the Trial court found that Trooper Bowles "stopped
the vehicle in which Mr. Juma was a passenger, because the driver failed
to move over for an emergency vehicle." Another finding was that
"Trooper Bowles felt it was dangerous to the safety of the UDOT
workers for the black Chevrolet not to move over as it passed." Further,
in its analysis, the Trial Court concluded that Utah Code Ann. §41-6aDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

n

904 did not define the UDOT vehicles as "authorized emergency
vehicles" and that "the Court finds Trooper Bowles made a good faith
mistake" in that he erroneously believed that the law required drivers to
move over to the adjacent, unoccupied travel lane when passing
emergency vehicles, without distinguishing the differences further
described in §41-6a-904(3), that the UDOT vehicles were not emergency
vehicles, and that the legal requirement for drivers passing such vehicles
does not include making a lane change where one is safely available.

B. The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law in Ruling that Trooper Bowles
had Reasonable Articulable Suspicion to Stop and Detain the Vehicle
Under Circumstances Where Bowles Mistakenly Believed that Utah
Code Ann. §41-6a-904 Requires Vehicles to Move to an Adjacent,
Unoccupied Lane of Travel While Passing UDOT Maintenance Vehicles
Displaying Flashing Amber (Yellow) Lights.
In gauging the legality of the stop of a motor vehicle, the officer's
"actual" motivation is not relevant; what counts is whether the driver, from a
purely objective point of view, was violating a motor vehicle law, or
behaving in such a manner as to give rise to reasonable suspicion of other
criminal activity. Wren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); United States
v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334 (11 th Cir. 2008); United States v. Nunez, 455 F.3d
1223, 1226 (11 th Cir. 2006). The notion of a "pretextual" stop is a non
sequitur. United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995)
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{en banc). See also, Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15. Either there was a motor
vehicle offense, or there was not. What motivated the officer is not relevant.
The trial court below drew its analysis from State v. Applegate, 194
P.3d 925 (Utah 2008) and State v. Friesen, 988 P.2d 7 (Ut App 1999), ruling
that "all that matters is that [the officer is] able to point to specific and
articulable facts regarding [a suspect's] conduct which, taken together with
rational inferences, created a reasonable suspicion of a violation of traffic
laws." (quoting Applegate, supra, at 931). The trial court determined that
although Trooper Bowles "obviously made a mistake about the specific
traffic law involved, he still had a reasonable articulable suspicion
Defendants had committed a traffic violation."
Since there was no evidence the trooper had stopped the car for a
contrived or improper purpose, the trial court concludes that his mistaken
understanding of what is and is not a violation of the traffic code doesn't
matter. The trial court concluded that because Trooper Bowles believed that
this failure to move over, despite no legal reason to do so, constituted a
potential safety hazard to the UDOT workers, this subjective belief gave him
reasonable suspicion to stop, detain and seize the vehicle and its occupants.
The trial court's own findings of fact and analysis that Trooper
Bowles mistakenly believed that the UDOT vehicles were emergency
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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vehicles under the statute, and that drivers are required to move over to the
adjacent unoccupied lane, confirm that Trooper Bowies' mistake was one of
law, not fact
A mistake of law is never objectively reasonable. See, United States
v. DeGasso, 69 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2004); State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214
(Utah App. 1999); State v. Friesen, supra; United States v. Herrera, 444
F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Valadez-Valadez, 525 F.3d (10th
Cir. 2008).
But by the trial court's analysis, the police can make an observation of
someone, erroneously believe that what they are observing is a violation, and
make a Level II stop when even a cursory reading of the statute allegedly
violated would show that the behavior observed is not in violation of the
law. This is a misreading of the rulings in Applegate and Fries en, supra.
In Applegate the Utah Supreme Court found that the arresting officer
was mistaken in his understanding of some aspects of the traffic code, but
was correct on one, namely, that "[h]e relied on his belief that residents of
Utah who purchase vehicles must register those vehicles in Utah .. . within
60 days of establishing residence here." (Citation omitted). The arresting
officer was mistaken on the application of other sections of the law, but was
spot-on in relying upon one part of the law supported by his factual
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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observations. This distinguishes Applegate from the instant case, where
Trooper Bowles was plainly wrong about the emergency vehicle section of
the law, and no other violation of law was observed that would redeem the
stop.
In Friesen, supra, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that stopping a
vehicle for lacking a front license plate, where the police knew that not all
states require a front plate, and where the officer had no actual knowledge of
whether Wyoming required a front plate, and was unclear about the front
plate requirement, lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion of any criminal
activity or traffic or equipment violation of the law. The court stated, "if the
conduct of the suspected person is clearly known and the officer's
uncertainty - his suspicion - regards the prohibitions of the law, the officer
has no basis upon which to make or defend the stop." 998 P.2d at 14.
The Courts have narrowly limited situations where an officer's good
faith mistake of law carves out an exception to the exclusionary rule. The
Utah Supreme Court describes these limited situations in State v. Baker,
2010 UT 18 (2010), stating, "[A] good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule exists when an officer acts in reasonable reliance on a warrant, United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 at 920 (1984), in reasonable reliance on a
statute later declared unconstitutional, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. at 349
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(1984), or in "objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently recalled
warrant.99 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. at 703." Baker at fS5.-.
However, the Fourth Amendment analysis in Baker stops short of
finding that the same exception exists under the Utah Constitution {Baker, fn
2). "[0]ur state's Declaration of Rights might change the result and impose
different demands on police officers and others who in a very real sense are
the everyday guardians of constitutional guarantees against unreasonable
searches and seizures." Id. The applicable language is found in Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized.
This Defendant asserts his rights against unreasonable search and seizure
under both the provisions of the Fourth Amendment, and the Utah
Constitution. The question of whether reasonable suspicion exists should be
based upon the facts known to the police officer at the time of the arrest.
Reasonable, articulable suspicion must be supported by what the law
actually is, not what the officer subjectively thought the law was. Applegate,
at Tfl4. •
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT SUPPRESSING ALL
EVIDENCE SEIZED WHERE TROOPER BOWLES DETAINED
THE DEFENDANT MUCH LONGER THAN NECESSARY TO
EFFECT THE PURPOSE OF THE STOP.
A.

Marshaling of Facts.

The trial court's findings of fact that support its decision to deny the
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence include the observations made
by Trooper Bowles after stopping and detaining Defendant. These
include details of a large amount of travel luggage for two people,
unusual nervousness of the occupants, the fact of the vehicle having been
rented in Nebraska while the driver was from Michigan and Juma was
from Kansas, the discrepancies between the two occupants' versions of
where they had traveled, and the dispatch report that Juma had prior
drug-related arrests (but no convictions). Facts supporting suppression
include that Trooper Bowles gave Flynn a written warning for driving
without a current valid license, and returned her paperwork, and then
initiated new questioning as she began to leave his patrol car, and that
Bowles sought consent to search the vehicle and was rebuffed before
deploying his canine for a drug sniff.
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B. The Trial Court Erred in Finding that the Detention of Juma and
Flynn was Not Excessive or Beyond the Scope of the Original Stop.
The Utah Courts in both Baker and Applegate, supra, applied a twostep test to determine whether a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. Applegate at \ 9. "The first step is to determine whether 'the
police officer's action [was] justified at its inception'. In the second step, we
must determine whether the detention following the stop was 'reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first
place.'" Id. (as cited in Baker, \ 12, quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d at
1131-32). Juma has already asserted that the stop was not justified.
Police conduct that constitutes an illegal detention beyond the scope
of the purpose of an ordinary traffic stop includes when police ask questions
about whether a vehicle's occupants possess drugs. "Subsequent or
concurrent detentions for questioning [about drugs] are justified only when
the officer has "reasonable suspicion" of illegal transactions in drugs or of
th

any other serious crime. " United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 872 (1(T Cir.
1995) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498-99).
In this case, Trooper Bowles detained Juma and Flynn for about 18
minutes while he simultaneously requested information and awaited
responses from his dispatch, and interrogated Flynn in the patrol car. The
amount of time
thatbyitthetook
obtain
of Law
identities,
Digitized
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the car's rental status, wants and warrants check and a background check can
vary under different conditions, and in this case, it took about 18 minutes.
Because Flynn was driving without a current, valid driver's license, Bowles
had reasonable suspicion of that violation, and any increase in the length of
the detention to obtain that basic background check is not the issue.
However, once Bowles gave Flynn a written warning citation and the
rest of her paperwork, and she started to leave his vehicle, Bowles had
concluded the purpose for the stop, and should have allowed them to leave.
State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002).
Further, during that wait, Bowles chose to not deploy his canine to
sniff the subject vehicle. Bowles had concluded the stop and released the
driver before initiating a new line of questioning and requesting permission
to search the vehicle. Only after letting Flynn go with a warning and being
rebuffed in his request to search the vehicle, did Bowles then order Flynn
and Juma to stand aside while he deployed his dog to sniff the exterior of
their vehicle. In People v. Brandon, 140 P. 3d 15, 19 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005)
the suppression of evidence was upheld for a dog search that occurred after
the purpose of the stop had concluded even though the dog was in the patrol
vehicle throughout the lawful duration of the stop.
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Under similar circumstances in State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18 at 114, the
Utah Supreme Court held that "the purpose of the stop concluded when the
officers finished processing the arrest [of the driver]. "We then hold that the
drug dog sniff that occurred after the purposes of the stop had been
completed violated Mr. Baker's Fourth Amendment rights." Id.
The police in Baker detained the passengers, including Baker, after
they had completed the arrest of the driver of their car, for the purpose of
waiting for a K-9 unit with a drug sniffing dog to arrive at the scene. After
arresting the driver for driving on a suspended license, the officers had no
further need to control the scene, so the Court assessed whether additional
detention of the passengers was lawful, since "even a small amount of
intrusion beyond the legitimate scope of an initially lawful search is
unlawful under the Fourth Amendment." Id at f 28 (quoting State v.
Schlosser, 774 P. 2d at 1135 (Utah 1989)).
Under the Fourth Amendment, it is well-settled that a dog sniff is not
a search, United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983), and that a drugtrained dog may walk the perimeter of a lawfully detained vehicle even if
police have no reasonable suspicion that the vehicle occupants are engaged
in drug-related activity so long as the dog sniff search does not extend the
duration of the stop. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005).
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Prolonging a seizure can become unlawful "if it is prolonged beyond the
time reasonably required to complete that mission." Id. at 407.
An officer cannot prolong a driver's detention after concluding the
purpose of the original stop without reasonable belief that the driver was
involved in other illegal activity. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 25, f 32. In
Hansen, the driver was detained for an illegal lane change and lack of car
insurance. The officer returned his license and registration and gave him a
verbal warning to get insurance, then the officer inquired if there were drugs
and alcohol in the car and asked for consent to search, which was given.
The Court held that the driver's consent was "the fruit of an illegal detention
because the officer continued to question him after the purpose of the stop
had concluded." Id. At f 32.
Detaining the occupants of a car beyond the lawful purpose of the stop
to conduct a dog sniff does not differ "in any meaningful way from detaining
occupants in order to request consent to search their car. Both a dog sniff
and a consent search are legal under the Fourth Amendment only when they
are performed during the course of a lawful stop." State v. Baker, 2010 UT
18 at 1f 33.
Trooper Bowles exceeded the scope of detention when he requested
permission to search the car. See, State v. Bissegger, 76 P.3d 178 (Utah
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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App. 2003) (citing State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 432, 437 (Utah App. 1990)
(finding a Fourth Amendment violation where police did not have the
"reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify their
continued detention and questioning of the [defendants] once . . . the purpose
for the initial stop had been accomplished.").

POINT III,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO
DISSIPATION OF REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION
WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE TERMINATION OF FURTHER
DETENTION AND THEREBY DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

A.

Marshaling of Facts.
The trial court does not directly address the notion of
"Dissipation of Reasonable Suspicion" in its Decision;
however, the State does argue that no such doctrine exists, and
that the observations of Trooper Bowles created sufficient
reasonable articulable suspicion of drug trafficking to justify
further detention, dog deployment and the search.

B.

The trial court erred in denying the Motion to Suppress under
circumstances where any basis in fact for reasonable articulable
suspicion of criminal activity had dissipated.
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In State v. Morris, 2009 UT App. 181, the court held that a traffic stop
must terminate and the driver and occupants must be immediately permitted
to leave, when the officer's reasonable articulable suspicion dissipates. In
Morris, the officer stopped a vehicle when he could not see a rear license
plate. Upon exiting his patrol car and approaching the vehicle on foot, the
officer observed a valid, current temporary paper license mounted in the rear
window of the car. Instead of continuing the stop, seeking license,
registration, insurance and background information, the officer should have
simply turned around and left, as he no longer had any reasonable suspicion
to detain this driver.
Police detention is no longer justified after reasonable suspicion
dissipates. Once the reason for the traffic stop has been resolved, "any
further temporary detention . .. constitutes an illegal seizure." State v.
Hansen, 63 P. 3d 650 at \ 31.
When Trooper Bowles gave Flynn a warning citation, returned her ID
card and other paperwork and she opened the door of his patrol car and
started leave, Bowles detained her and Juma further to inquire about drugs
and request a consent search. If Bowles had some new or heightened
suspicion regarding luggage, rental car contracts, etc., he would not have
released Flynn. Trooper Bowles own actions in concluding the purpose of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the stop would indicate that any reasonable articulable suspicion had
dissipated, and there was no further compelling reason to detain Flynn and
Juma.
Once the police have issued a traffic citation for a minor violation, the
Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from searching the vehicle as though
it were incident to an arrest. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998). In
Knowles, the police stopped the driver for speeding, issued him a written
citation, and then proceeded to search the interior of his vehicle, finding
drug contraband. In it's ruling, the Supreme Court stated:
Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation,
all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been
obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to
be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger
compartment of the car. Id.
POINT IV,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM A
WARRANTLESS SEARCH WITHOUT SUFFICIENT PROBABLE
CAUSE AND WITHOUT EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES.
A.

Marshaling of Facts.
The trial court found nothing wrong with Trooper Bowles
further detention of the vehicle's occupants in order to deploy
his trained service animal to conduct a drug sniff, and upon
receiving an indication from the dog, conducting an immediate
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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search of the interior of the vehicle and the closed containers
within the vehicle, without first obtaining a search warrant

B.

The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law in Denying the
Motion to Suppress Evidence Where Trooper Bowles
Conducted a Search of the Interior of the Vehicle and the
Closed Containers Therein, Absent Exigent Circumstances,
Without First Seeking and Obtaining a Search Warrant, Based
on Probable Cause, in Violation of Both the Fourth Amendment
and Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article
I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, protect citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures of their persons, houses, papers, and effects by the
government. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
"The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, which is
measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances."
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500
U.S. 248,250 (1991)). Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment
"depends 'on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right
to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers."' State
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v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,131 78 P. 3d 590 (quoting United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, All U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).
Fourth Amendment analyses should always begin with the basic rule
that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009)
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). Among these
exceptions would be where a suspect might gain possession of a weapon or
destroy evidence. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.752 at 763.
Utah's Constitution provides greater protection from unreasonable
search and seizure than does the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. See, State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465-8 (Utah 1990); State
v. Gardner, 814 P. 2d 568, 571 (Utah 1991).
With all the occupants out of the car, off the side of the road, unable
to hide or destroy anything, during daylight hours on a weekday, there were
no exigent circumstances that would demand an immediate search of the
vehicle without first obtaining a warrant from a magistrate, based on an
affidavit of the officer articulating the details giving rise to probable cause.
In these modem times, electronic means such as telephone and email are
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routinely used to obtain warrants, and it's not like Flynn and Juma were
going to run off on foot along the 1-70 freeway near Salina!
Bowles lacked any exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless
search, such as preventing the imminent destruction of evidence. State v.
Duran, 2007 UT 23 f 7 , 156 P.3d 795. It was not the middle of the night, it
wasn't even raining, nor were there other reasons that would have made it
difficult to obtain a warrant without much delay. See, State v. Rodriguez,
2007 UT 15,1fi[43-44, 156 P. 3d 771.
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it denied Defendant's
Motion to Suppress Evidence. The mistake of law by Trooper Bowles in
stopping and detaining Defendant is insurmountable by any degree of "good
faith" he may have had in his erroneous understanding of the traffic code,
namely, the definition of "emergency vehicles" and the duties of motorists
under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-904. Since the stop was not valid, no amount
of subsequently observed facts matter, and the evidence should be excluded.
The new suspicions raised by Bowles observations regarding luggage,
car rental and residency details, and so forth, are insufficient to justify
detaining Juma further. Once Bowles gave Flynn, the driver, a warning
citation and her other paperwork, the stop was over, and further detention of
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Flynn and Juma was unlawful. With the act of completing his investigation
and issuing a warning citation, Bowles conceded that his potentially
reasonable articulable suspicions of drug trafficking had dissipated, and
further detention of the vehicle occupants was unjustified. By further
detaining the occupants to conduct a drug sniff by his dog, Bowles violated
Juma's rights under both the Fourth Amendment and the Utah Constitution.
In conducting a warrantless search of the vehicle absent exigent
circumstances, Bowles infringed upon Juma's rights under both the Fourth
Amendment and the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14.
WHEREFORE, Defendant/Appellant Ramon Juma requests this
Court to Overrule the Decision of the trial court below denying his Motion
to Suppress Evidence.
SUBMITTED this $f)

day of October, 2010.

Edwara D. Flint
Attorney for Ramon Juma
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTR.ICT
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*

STATE OF UTAH,

:
Plaintiff,

vs.

:
: •

RAMON A. JUMA,
DOB: 03/08/72
Defendant.

:

INFORMATION

Case No.
Judge
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The undersigned, Dale P. Eyre, Sevier County Attorney,
states on information and belief that the Defendant committed the
crimes of:
COUNT 1:

POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT

TO DISTRIBUTE, contrary to Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iii), Utah Code
Annotated, in that said Defendant did, on or about the 31st day of
March, 20 09, at the County of Sevier, State of Utah, knowingly and

\y\ intentionally possess with intent to distribute a controlled or
ff

counterfeit substance, to-wit: marijuana, the same constituting a
Felony of the Third Degree,
COUNT 2:

POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, contrary to

Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), Utah Code Annotated, in that said Defendant
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Page 2—Information
State of Uah vs. Ramon A. Juma
>

did, on or about March 31, 2 009, at the County of Sevier, State of
Utah, knowingly and intentionally possess or use a controlled
substance, to-wit: cocaine, all of which constitutes a Felony of the
Third Degree.
This information is based on evidence obtained from the
following witnesses: Nick Bowles
Authorized for presentment and filing
on the

/^

day of April, 2009.

DALE P. EYRE
Sevier County Attorney
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Edward D.Flint 4573
Jonathon W. Grimes 10462
ACCESS LEGAL
Attorneysfor Defendant
455 East 400 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-363-5297
Facsimile: 801-532-2063
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SEVIER COUNTY, RICHFIELD DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

Plaintiff,
>

vs.
RAMONA.JUMA,

Case No.: 091600075

Defendant.

Judge Wallace A. Lee

COMES NOW the Defendant, Ramon A. Juma, through counsel of record, Edward D.
Flint, and Respectfully MOVES this Court to Order the Suppression of certain evidence and
testimony in this case, for reason that the State has violated the Defendant's Constitutional rights
in obtaining same. This Motion is further supported by the accompanying Memorandum.
DATED this

/()

day of August, 2009.

EdwaraT). Flint
Attorney for Defendant
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

//A.

I certify that on the^HT day^August, 2009,1 personally mailed/hand-delivered/faxed a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence; and
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence to the following:
Sevier County Attorney
835 East 300 North, Suite 100
Richfield, UT 84701

Edward D. Flint

^
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Edward D.Flint 4573
Jonathon W. Grimes 10462
ACCESS LEGAL
Attorneysfor Defendant
455 East 400 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-363-5297
Facsimile: 801-532-2063
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SEVIER COUNTY, RICHFIELD DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

Plaintiff,
vs.
RAMONA.JUMA,

Case No.: 091600075
Judge Wallace A. Lee

Defendant.

COMES NOW the Defendant, Ramon A. Juma, through counsel of record, Edward D.
Flint, and Respectfully Submits the following Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion
to Suppress Evidence.
INTRODUCTION AND DISCLAIMER
Defendant Juma's counsel, Edward D. Flint, submits this Motion and Memorandum at
the conclusion of the Preliminary Hearing in this matter, and reserves the opportunity to revise or
>*•
CvJ
CD
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppr-^
*S^r/
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supplement the contents hereof, should the sworn testimony at the Preliminary Hearing differ
from the representations herein.
RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On March 31,2009, Defendant Ramon A. Juma (Juma) was riding in the front
passenger seat of a black, four-door Chevrolet sedan that he had rented several days
earlier.

2.

The vehicle was driven by Juma's traveling companion, Diamond Flynn.

3.

Trooper Nick Bowles of the Utah Highway Patrol reports that he was in his patrol
vehicle, stationary in the median of Interstate 70 near milepost 57 and observed the
black Chevy in the eastbound, outside lane (right lane), as it passed by several Utah
Dept. of Transportation vehicles on the eastbound shoulder, with their emergency
lights flashing.

4.

Trooper Bowles states that the Chevy did not change lanes to the unoccupied left lane
as it neared and passed the UDOT vehicles, and that is why he proceeded to stop the
vehicle.

5.

Upon detaining Flynn and Juma, Trooper Bowles discovered that Flynn did not
possess a valid driver's license.

6.

Trooper Bowles ordered both occupants out of the vehicle, took the picture ID's of
both, and placed Juma along the passenger side of the car, and ordered him to remain
there while he spoke with Flynn in the patrol car.

8
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Trooper Bowles immediately advised Flynn that he was going to issue her a warning
citation for the driving violation.
Trooper Bowles interrogated Flynn in the patrol car and radioed to his dispatch for
information on both Flynn and Juma, and briefly spoke with Juma outside of the
patrol vehicle, for approximately 18 minutes before finally issuing a "warning"
citation to Flynn and telling her she could leave.
Flynn exited the patrol vehicle and started back towards the rented Chevy. Trooper
Bowles then asked Flynn if she would wait a moment, "if we could talk some more."
Bowles then asked her if there were any illegal narcotics in the vehicle, Flynn
responded that there were none; Bowles then asked if she would consent to a search
of the vehicle. Flynn declined and stated that it was Juiiia's vehicle.
Trooper Bowles then asked Juma if there were any illegal narcotics in the vehicle,
and Juma replied that there were none; Bowles asked Juma if he could search the
vehicle, and Juma refused to grant any such permission.
Trooper Bowles then deployed a canine which ultimately resulted in Bowles
searching the defendant's vehicle, where marijuana was discovered, and both Juma
and Flynn were arrested. Upon a search of Juma, a small amount of cocaine was
found in his clothing.
Juma is now before this Court charged by Information with a Third Degree Felony for
the Possession of cocaine, a Third Degree Felony for Possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ARGUMENT I.
TROOPER BOWLES LACKED REASONABLE SUSPICION
TO STOP THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE
The statement of Trooper Bowles that the sole reason for stopping the Chevrolet driven
by Flynn, where Juma was a passenger, was and is, that the vehicle failed to move over and
change lanes while approaching and passing the UDOT crew on the right shoulder of eastbound
1-70. He specifically states that the UDOT vehicles had their yellow (amber) lights flashing, and
that the left travel lane was unoccupied, and that Flynn could have moved into the left lane
before passing the UDOT vehicles.
Defendant submits that there is no legal requirement for the driver of a vehicle to move
over, move to the left or change lanes while approaching or passing a highway maintenance
vehicle with its yellow (amber) lights flashing. A driver is only required to slow down and
provide as much space as practical to the stationary highway maintenance vehicle. The law in
Utah is:
41-6a-904. Approaching emergency vehicle - Necessary signals Stationary emergency vehicle — Duties of respective operators.
(1) Except when otherwise directed by a peace officer, the operator of a
vehicle, upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle using
audible or visual signals under Section 41-6a-212 or 41-6a-1625, shall:
(a) yield the right-of-way and immediately move to a position parallel to, and
as close as possible to, the right-hand edge or curb of the highway, clear of any
intersection; and
(b) then stop and remain stopped until the authorized emergency vehicle has
passed.
(2) The operator of a vehicle, upon approaching a stationary authorized
emergency vehicle that is displaying alternately flashing red, red and white, or red
and blue lights, shall:
(a) reduce the speed of the vehicle;

C\|
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(b) provide as much space as practical to the stationary authorized emergency
vehicle; and
(c) if traveling in a lane adjacent to the stationary authorized emergency
vehicle and if practical, with due regard to safety and traffic conditions, make a
lane change into a lane not adjacent to the authorized emergency vehicle.
(3) The operator of a vehicle, upon approaching a stationary tow truck or
highway maintenance vehicle that is displaying flashing amber lights, shall:
(a) reduce the speed of the vehicle; and
(b) provide as much space as practical to the stationary tow truck or highway
maintenance vehicle.
(4) This section does not relieve the operator of an authorized emergency
vehicle, tow truck, or highway maintenance vehiclefromthe duty to drive with
regard for the safety of all persons using the highway.
Trooper Bowles should not have stopped the Chevy sedan driven by Flynn. She would only
have been required to move over, move left or change lanes if an official emergency vehicle was
stopped, flashing red, red and white or red and blue lights, as required in section (2) of the
statute.
The UDOT vehicles with their flashing yellow (amber) lights are governed by section (3)
of the statute. The UDOT vehicles were completely off of the highway, on the shoulder, and not
impeding traffic. Ms. Flynn did nothing wrong, and Trooper Bowles had no reasonable
articulable suspicion of an actual violation of the law that would permit him to stop the Chevy
sedan.
Protection from unreasonable search and seizure is guaranteed under the United States
Constitution, Amendment Four, and the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14, which gives
even broader protection. State v. Larocco. 794 P2d 460, 465-8 (Utah 1990); State v. Gardner.
814P.2d568,571 (Utah 1991).
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Officer Baldwin stopped and detained Defendant without any reasonably articulated
suspicion that she had committed any violation, and thereby detained her unlawfully. State v.
Deitman, 739 P2d 616,618 (Utah 1987); See, also Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1990).
Since the stop and detention of defendant was illegal from its inception, any evidence or
information obtained subsequent to the stop is inadmissible under the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine, and must be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States. 371 US 471,487-88 (1963).
ARGUMENT IL
TROOPER BOWLES DETAINED FLYNN AND JUMA
MUCH LONGER THAN NECESSARY TO EFFECT
THE PURPOSE OF THE STOP
Even if the original stop of Flynn and Juma was somehow justified, Trooper Bowies'
stated purpose was first, the traffic violation, secondly, Flyim's lack of a valid drivers license,
and finally, whether Flynn or Juma had any warrants. Certainly, during the course of the
detention for these purposes, a well-trained and experienced law enforcement officer will look
for other indicia of criminal activity.
However, the facts herein are that the very first thing Trooper Bowles told Flynn was that
he was going to only issue a warning citation to her for driving without a license, and require that
Juma drive the car away, after doing a background check. Both Flynn and Juma passed the
check; neither had any wants or warrants.
Trooper Bowles did discover, however, during the background check, that Juma had
some prior arrests for DUI and for narcotics possession (it must be noted that all of Juma5 s prior
arrests for drug possession resulted in dismissals, and his only conviction is for a DUI). Trooper
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Bowles detained Flynn and Juma some 18 minutes, found no reason to arrest or detain either any
further, and issued Flynn a warning citation, and she started to leave.
Only then did Bowles detain them again, and begin a new interrogation, and set forth a
new demand to search the vehicle.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures." U.S. Const, amend. IV. The United States Supreme Court has held that "stopping
an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, "even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite
brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Thus, "although a person has a lesser
expectation of privacy in a car than in his or her home, one does not lose the protection of the
Fourth Amendment while in an automobile." State v. Schlossen 774 P.2d 1132,1135 (Utah
1989).
To determine whether a Level Two seizure is constitutionally reasonable, courts make a
dual inquiry: (1) Was the police officers action "justified at its inception"? and (2) Was the
resulting detention "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the
. interference in thefirstplace"? State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 660 (Utah 2002).
Juma claims the stop was unjustified from the outset.
The second question is whether the stop continued to be reasonably related in scope to
the traffic violation which justified it in thefirstplace. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah
1994).

13
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Regarding the second question, during a traffic stop an officer "may request a driver's
license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a1 citation." State v. Hansen.
63 P3d at 660. However, the traffic stop "must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491,500, 75.
LJBd.2d 229,103 S.Ct 1319 (1983) (emphasis added).
In other words:
Once the purpose of the initial stop is concluded, however, die person must be allowed to
depart. "Any further temporary detention for investigative questioning after
fulfilling the purpose for the initial traffic stop" constitutes an illegal seizure, unless
an officer has probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a further illegality.
State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d at 660. (emphasis added).
Thus, the issue is not how long the additional detention lasted or how intrusive it was.
The Utah Supreme Court is clear: "Any further temporary detention" for investigative
questioning after fulfilling the original purpose for the initial traffic stop constitutes an illegal
seizure, unless an officer has probable cause to arrest or a reasonable suspicion of a further
illegality. Id
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In determining whether a person remains seized within the meaning for Fourth
Amendment, after the original purpose of a traffic stop has been fulfilled, Utah courts
have followed the totality of the circumstances standard: A person is seized under the
Fourth Amendment when, considering the totality of the circumstances, the police
conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was notfreeto
decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter and go about his or her
business. State v. Mogen, 52 P.3d 462,466 (Utah App. 2002), citing United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,554,100 S.Ct 1870,1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980).
One example of police conduct that constitutes illegal detention beyond the scope
of the purpose of an ordinary traffic stop is when police ask questions about whether a.
vehicle's occupants possess drugs. The "correct rule" regarding this type of questioning
is that: "in strict accordance with Terry and its progeny, questioning during a traffic stop
must be limited to the purpose of the traffic stop and thus may not be extended to the
subject of drugs." Wayne R. LaFave, The "Routine Traffic Stop " From Start to Finish:
Too Much "Routine/'Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1843,1887
(August 2004), citing, inter alia, United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 872 (10th Cir. 1995)
(stating that "[subsequent or concurrent detentions for questioning [about drugs] are
justified only when the officer has "reasonable suspicion" 'of illegal transactions in drugs
or of any other serious crime.'"), quoting Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491,498-99, 75
L.Ed.2d 229,103 S.Ct. 1319(1983).
Similarly, requests by police for consent to search a vehicle after questioning
about drugs is beyond the permissible scope of an ordinary traffic stop and searches
conducted pursuant to such consent are illegal. Lafave, supra at 1893, citing State v.
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Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415,419 (Minn. 2003) (suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to a
consent search because the officer's "consent inquiry [about narcotics and weapons]...
went beyond the scope of the traffic stop and was unsupported by any reasonable
articulable suspicion.").
Utah law follows the rule described above. For example, in State v. Hansen, 63
P.3d 650 (Utah 2002), the court held that the officer exceeded the permissible scope of
the traffic stop by asking for permission to search the vehicle for drugs without having
reasonable suspicion to do so. Id at 666-67. Similarly, in State v. Bissegger, 76 P.3d
178 (Utah App. 2003), the court held that an officer "exceeded the scope of detention
when he requested permission to search the car." Id at 183-84, citing State v. Robinson.
797 P.2d 432,437 (Utah App. 1990) (finding Fourth Amendment violation where police
did not have "the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify their
continued detention and questioning of the [defendants] once...the purpose for the initial
stop had been accomplished.5').
Particularly instructive to the case at bar is State v. Mogen, 52 P.3d 462 (Utah
App. 2002). In Mogen, police conducted an investigatory stop of defendant's truck for
speeding, took the defendant's driver's license, and conducted a routine license and
warrants check, then returned the defendant's license and issued him a verbal warning for
speeding. Id. at 464. Then, the officer took a few steps toward his patrol car, turned
around asked if he could search the truck for drugs. Id.
On appeal, the State admitted that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to
justify a search, but argued that "once the officer told Defendant he was free to go and
stepped backfromthe vehicle towards his police car, the seizure ended. Therefore, when
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the officer turned around and again approached Defendant, the encounter had deescalated to a level-one stop and reasonable suspicion to search was not necessary." Id.
at 466.
The court of appeals, however, rejected the State's position and upheld the trial
court's ruling that the "[defendant remained seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment when the officer asked to search his truck" and concluded that therefore the
evidence discovered during the subsequent consensual search was properly suppressed.
Idat467.
Similarly, in the case at bar, Trooper Bowies' questioning of the driver about
drugs was beyond the scope of any permissible stop. Bowles extended the encounter by
asking for permission to search the vehicle for drugs. Moreover, Bowles started
questioning the occupants for permission to search without any reason for believing there
could be drugs in the vehicle. In addition, even when he was told that there were no
drugs in the vehicle he continued to investigate and detain the occupants by asking for
permission to search the vehicle anyway. Such questioning was outside the scope of the
circumstances that justified the initial stop and thus constituted an unreasonable seizure
of the vehicle's occupants.
ARGUMENT IIL
TROOPER BOWLES' WARRANTLESS SEARCH
VIOLATES DEFENDANTS5 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Warrantless searches "arcper se unreasonable," "subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U. S.
347 . The exception for a search incident to a lawful arrest applies only to "the area from
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within which [an arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence."
Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, at 763.
The Supreme Court of the United States has clearly ruled that police may search
the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if it is
reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or
that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Arizona v.Gant

U.S.

, No. 07-542, Opinion published on April 21,2009.
Even if Flynn had been arrested for driving without a license or not yielding to an
emergency vehicle, the car cannot be searched. But Trooper Bowles first has a dog sniff
the exterior of the car, and when Bowles makes a different hand signal to the dog, and the
dog starts barking, Bowles declares that the dog has alerted, and then conducts a fullscale search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle.
CONCLUSION
The defendants were stopped without any reasonable articulable suspicion of any
actual or possible violation of the law. They were detained much longer than necessary
to effect the purpose of the stop. Ttrooper Bowles terminated the Level II detention when
he gave Flynn a warning citation and permission to leave; he could not re-engage Flynn
and Juma without new articlable facts of criminal activity. Bowles conducted a
warrantless search of defendants5 vehicle despite having released them to leave, and
without any possible reason of securing his own safety or other legal reason for a
warrantless search.
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All of the evidence seized from Juma and Flynn should be suppressed as having
been obtained through unlawful means, in violation of the defendants' Constitutional
rights.
DATED this

/U

day of August, 2009.

Edward D.Flint
Attorney for Ramon A. Juma, Defendant

-co

<n

cy

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19

cfc
o'«=>

Date:.

Edward D.Flint 4573
Jonathon W. Grimes 10462
ACCESS LEGAL
Attorneysfor Defendant
455 East 400 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-363-5297
Facsimile: 801-532-2063

6th District Court
Sevier County

Clerk:

SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SEVIER COUNTY, RICHFIELD DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM REGARDING
EVIDENCE SUPPRESSION

vs.
RAMONA.JUMA,

Case No.: 091600075

Defendant

Judge Wallace A. Lee

COMES NOW the Defendant, Ramon A. Juma, through counsel of record,
Edward D. Flint, and Respectfully Submits the following Supplemental Memorandum in
Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence.
ISSUE NUMBER 1: GOOD FAITH MISTAKE
Defendant assumes the State will argue that Trooper Bowles' mistake in stopping
the Defendants' vehicle for failing to change lanes while passing a UDOT maintenance
vehicle, was a "Good Faith" mistake, thereby negating Defendants' claim that there was
never any reasonable, articulable suspicion of a violation of law to permit Bowles to
make the stop in the first place. However, this is an erroneous view of Utah law.
*"*

Generally, the state of mind of the police is not relevant in assessing whether
Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum Regarding B
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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there has been Fourth or Fifth Amendment violations. Whether a person is "in custody"
for Miranda purposes, for example, is viewed by the court objectively, based on the
circumstances, not the state of mind of the police or the defendant. Whether there is
probable cause to arrest is viewed objectively, not the officer's state of mind.
But when it comes to determining whether the exclusionary rule should apply, the
court frequently focuses on the good faith of the.police - the office making the arrest, or
the officer providing information that prompts the arrest.
In gauging the legality of the stop of a motor vehicle, basic hornbook law is that
the officer's "actual" motivation is not relevant; what counts is whether the driver,froma
purely objective point of view, was violating a motor vehicle law. Wren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806 (1996); United States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2008); United '
States v. Nunez, 455 F.3d 1223,1226 (11th Cir. 2006). Thus, the notion of a "pretextuaJ"
arrest is a non sequitur. United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783,787 (10th Cir.
1995) {en banc). Either there was a motor vehicle offense, or there was not. What
motivated the officer is not relevant.
If the state acknowledges that there was not probable cause for the arrest/search,
the prosecution may argue that the police acted in good faith, but this means "objective"
good faith, not "subjective" good faith. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987). What
counts is what information was known to the officer and whether, given that information,
he acted in good faith in making the arrest or the search.
But a mistake as to the taw - even if it is in good faith - is not a valid "defense" to
suppression. Decisions in Utah appear to hew closer to the line: mistakes of law are
never "objectively reasonable" whereas mistakes of fact are often forgiven. See, e.g.,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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United States v. DeGasso, 69 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2004); State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214
(Utah Court of Appeals 1988); State v. Friesen, 988 P.2d 7 (Utah Court of Appeals
1999); United States v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Valadez-Valadez, 525 F.3d 987 (10th Cir, 2008).
So when it comes to deciding whether a defendant's Fourth or Fifth Amendment
rights have been violated, the basic rule is that police officers' intentions are not what
matters. When it comes to the question of the application of the exclusionary rule after it
has been decided that the objective facts establish a violation of the defendant's Fourth or
Fifth Amendment rights, however, the police officer's state of mind is front and center,
assuming he acts reasonably, given the objective facts known to him.
In this case, Trooper Bowles testified at the Preliminary Hearing that the
Defendants were stopped for the sole and exclusive reason that the driver (Flynn) failed
to move into the unoccupied left lane while passing the UDOT vehicles on therightside
shoulder of thefreeway,which had their yellow lightsflashing.(Transcript, p. 13, line 25
through p. 17, line 4). As previously argued, this is not a violation of law,
ISSUE NUMBER 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCH NOT PERMITTED
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that we reach the issue of whether Trooper
Bowles could search Defendants' vehicle based upon his determination that the totality of
the circumstances, coupled with his dog alerting and indicating possible presence of
illegal drugs, gave Bowles the unfettered authority to conduct a warrantless search of the
vehicle. It is not disputed that Bowles lacked any permission or consent to search, as
each Defendant specifically declined to consent to any search.
The Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section, 14, states:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized
There is no reason why Trooper Bowles could not have called into his dispatch to
start the process of obtaining a search warrant. There were no exigent circumstances,
since both Defendants were outside of the vehicle and could not have hidden or destroyed
any potential evidence in the vehicle. The United States Supreme Court recently
reiterated that Fourth Amendment analyses should always begin "with the basic rule that
'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are perse unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."' Arizona v. Gant 129 S. Ct
1710,1716 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,357 (1967)). And Utah
law makes clear that any police detention must be justified by reasonable suspicion of a
crime; police detention is no longer justified after reasonable suspicion dissipates. See
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, K 31,63 P.3d 650 (stating that once the reason for the
traffic stop has been resolved, i.e., reasonable suspicion has dissipated, "[a]ny further
temporary detention... constitutes an illegal seizure").
ISSUE NUMBER 3: DISPOILATION OF EVIDENCE
Trooper Bowles admitted, during testimony at the Preliminary Hearing, that his
uniform microphone was inoperable, that the batteries were dead, and that is the reason
why all conversations outside of his patrol vehicle were not recorded; (Transcript p. 23
line 14, through p. 24, line 12). Part of the Trooper's observations used in determining
the "totality of the circumstances" giving rise to his increased articulable suspicions,
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justifying further detention and search, were his conversations with Defendants outside of
his patrol vehicle.
Utah Highway Patrol Operating Policy 3-3-16 was promulgated in 1996 and
revised in 2005 to govern, among other things the appropriate usage of the mobile video
recording ("M.V.R") equipment that is standard in Utah Highway Patrol vehicles. The
purpose of the procedures is to maximize the benefits of this equipment in the
prosecution of various offenses and in the evaluation of troopers' performance. The
Operating Policy is explicit in stating that troopers "shall follow the procedures set forth
in this policy". Section III-A-2 states, "It is mandatory that M.V.R. equipment operators
record both audio and video portions of all police related activities." Section III-A-3
further states that the M.V.R. equipment will continue recording until the incident has
concluded. "If the recording is stopped before the incident concludes, the trooper will
state on the tape why the equipment is being turned off."
The purpose for these instructions is clear. In a case such as a DUI, or the instant
case where the totality of circumstances is most relevant, the interpretation of a
defendant's demeanor, appearance and speech patterns are crucial for the finder of fact to
make a correct determination, and certainly the content of the conversation, the exact
questions asked and the precise answers given. Videotape evidence is particularly useful ,
because it allows a jury, instead of receiving testimony through thefilterof a testifying
officer or defendant, to "draw Us own conclusions" State v. Zinsli, 156 Or. App. 245,
254 (Or. 1998) (emphasis in original). However, in this case, Trooper Bowles decided to
departfromUtah Highway PatroPs Policy..
In the wake of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), a tremendous number of

. *T* -.
££
CD
CD

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cases have dealt with the ramifications of the destruction of evidence in light of the Brady
court's ruling that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or
punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. While it cannot
be argued that any State agent literally destroyed evidence, Defendant urges this Court to
recognize that Trooper Bowies' actions have the same net result.
ISSUE NUMBER 4: DISSIPATION OF REASONABLE SUSPICION
Once Trooper Bowles chose to give a warning citation to Defendant Flynn, he
permitted her to exit his patrol vehicle, gave her a warning citation and returned all of her
other documents, he has capitulated that all reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity
had dissipated. Flynn was leaving when Bowles stopped her again and asked for more
information. Utah law makes clear that any police detention must be justified by
reasonable suspicion of a crime; police detention is no longer justified after reasonable
suspicion dissipates. See State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 125, If 31,63 P.3d 650 (stating that
once the reason for the traffic stop has been resolved, i.e., reasonable suspicion has
dissipated, "[a]ny further temporary detention... constitutes an illegal seizure"). The
Fourth Amendment does not allow officers to prolong a flawed encounter. State v.
Morris, 2009 UTApp 181.
It is simply logical that an officer gives a driver a warning citation, returns her
paperwork, and she begins to leave, that the officer's previous suspicions, supported by
whatever observations he has already made, are now dissipated; otherwise, the officer
would not give the citation and documents to the driver, which is a clear indication of the
end of the traffic stop.
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CONSLCUSION
The State's evidence in this case must be suppressed. The officer had no legal
basis to make a traffic stop. His mistake of law is not an excuse. Even ifthe officer had
established probable cause to search the vehicle, he had no authority to conduct a
warrantless search; there were no exigent circumstances. Since a "totality of the
circumstances" is the required standard in determining whether there were sufficient
articulated facts to permit the detention, the Trooper's microphone failure, in violation of
his own agency's policy, has eliminated many of those facts from being objectively
reviewed, and prompts a Brady concern that exculpatory evidence has been withheld or
destroyed. Finally, any facts amounting to reasonable suspicion had dissipated enough
for the officer to give the driver a warning and by all appearances, to leave; his restopping and re-detaining of the Defendants after the dissipation of suspicion was a
violation of their rights,
WHEREFORE, Defendants Pray this Court to Order the Suppression of all
Evidence seized by the State in this matter.
DATED this (/I

day of September, 2009.

••

/kfco
Edward D. Flint
Attorney for Defendant Juma
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Dale P. Eyre #7193
Sevier County Attorney
Sevier County Justice Complex
835 East 300 North, Suite 100
Richfield, Utah 84701
Telephone: (435) 896-2675
Fax No.: (435) 896-1706

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,
vs.
RAMON A. JUMA,
DOB: 03/08/72

Case No. 091600075
Judge Wallace A. Lee

Defendant.

The State of Utah submits the following Memorandum in
opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence and requests
that the Court deny Defendant's Motion.

FACTS
1.

On March 31, 2009, a Tuesday, at approximately 9:30

a.m., Trooper Nick Bowles was sitting in the median conducting traffic
patrol on 1-70.
2.

The Trooper's position was east of Salina approximately

one quarter-mile east of the eastbound on-ramp. His cruiser is facing
west monitoring eastbound traffic.
M.iT«li?"5t,.,IlJ"M?£P.2?.ition t o Defendant's Motion to J
"""""
""
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3.

To the south and east of the Trooper's location, behind

him, at a distance of twenty feet, Utah Department of Transportation
(UDOT) crews were working on a highway traffic sign for the eastbound
lanes.

Three trucks and a loader were parked or working on the

shoulder, off the roadway to the right of the eastbound lanes-

All of

the vehicles which had amber emergency lights were flashing.
4.

One UDOT truck was parked west of the sign with one half

of the vehicle on the gravel shoulder and one half on the pavement but
not in the lane of traffic. The other two UDOT trucks and loader were
parked or operating off the pavement, on the gravel shoulder with
flashing lights. Workers on the ground were walking around.
5.

At the location of the trooper and the UDOT crew, the

acceleration lane of.the on-ramp had fully merged with the lane of
traffic. No solid line was preventing vehicles from changing lanes at
the location of the UDOT crew.
6.

When Trooper Bowles first observed the Defendant's

vehicle, it was accelerating up the on-ramp to merge with the
eastbound freeway.

A tractor-trailer semi was in front of the

Defendant's vehicle and was also merging onto the freeway.
7.

The Trooper observed both vehicles travel in the same

lane passing the UDOT crews without slowing down or moving over.

The

Trooper's observations were that both vehicles were accelerating and
could have moved over in their lane or safely changed lanes.
8.

The trooper concluded that it was unsafe for the

vehicles to travel close to the UDOT crews without slowing down,

.
OQ

moving over in their lane or changing lanes. No evasive action was
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taken by the Defendant's vehicle of any kind even within its own lane.
9.

Upon his approach to the stopped vehicle, Trooper Bowles

noticed an unusual amount of luggage.

The Defendant's vehicle was a

Chevrolet HHR which is a small SUV with an open storage-luggage
compartment.

The officer testified that normal luggage for a trip as

described by the Defendant would be two to four pieces of luggage.
The Trooper estimated the luggage at six to seven pieces, packed as if
moving instead of traveling or shopping.
10.

Trooper Bowles also noticed that the occupants were

unusually nervous. The Trooper admitted that most drivers are nervous
during a traffic stop, but the Defendant and driver showed extreme
nervousness with trembling hands and appeared frantic in their search
for licenses and registration.

Also noteworthy was the Defendant's

effort to get out of the vehicle which the Trooper noted is very
unusual and generally indicates an attempt to keep or divert the
officer away from the vehicle.
11.

The Trooper obtains identification from each occupant

and notes the state of registration of the vehicle. The Defendant is
from Kansas, the driver is from Michigan and the vehicle is registered
in Nebraska.

Trooper Bowles testified that this is an indicator of

drug trafficking because the enterprise brings together people from
different areas, renting cars, and transporting drugs across the
country.
12.

Trooper Bowles asks Ms. Flynn, the driver, to accompany

him to his cruiser to issue a citation or warning.

Once in his

vehicle, he radios dispatch and begins preparing the paperwork.- While
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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doing so, he engages Ms. Flynn in conversation about her travel plans.
13.

The Trooper learns from Ms. Flynn. that they had begun

their trip on Wednesday and it took two days to drive.

They had

stayed five days in Reno, Nevada at multiple hotels because Mr. Juma
has a player's club membership by which his rooms are paid for by the
casinos.

Because it was only early Tuesday morning and it takes ten

hours to get to Sevier County from Reno, Trooper Bowles was suspicious
of her story.

According to her account, she should have still been in

Reno until Wednesday, the following day.
14.

While waiting for dispatch after finishing the warning,

Trooper Bowles went back to the Defendant's vehicle to speak with Mr.
Juma.

He learned from him that they had only been gone three days;

stayed in San Francisco at only one hotel, a Holiday Inn.

Mr. Juma

specifically said they had not gone anywhere else.
15.

Trooper Bowles returned to his cruiser and confronted

Ms. Flynn about the California trip. Ms. Flynn is careful in her
answer and tries to buy some time to think by responding with a
question: "On this trip?"

Once she figures out that Mr. Juma must

have mentioned California instead of Reno to the Trooper, she confirms
that "we did go into California for a day."
16.

During this time, dispatch returned an arrest history

for Mr. Juma including drug arrests. Trooper Bowles also noted that
the occupants mentioned traveling from known drug trafficking sources.
17.

Trooper Bowles then issued the warning to Ms. Flynn,

returned her documents, and asked her if she had any questions. Ms.
Flynn then got out of the vehicle.

The Trooper did not tell her she
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was free to go nor that she was detained; but as she was leaving, he
asked her if he could talk to her some more.
18.

Trooper Bowles testified that he would not have allowed

either occupant to leave. He requested permission to search the
vehicle from each occupant and was denied consent.

It was Trooper

Bowles' intent to conduct a canine search of the vehicle and that is
in fact what the officer did.
19.

Trooper Bowles testified that he and his police dog,

Cica, are certified by the Utah Police Officer Standards and Training
Academy for narcotics detection and handling.

The Trooper explained

that his dog is an "agressive indicator", which means the dog will
bark, paw and/or scratch to indicate narcotics.
20.

In this case, Cica indicated with both barking and

scratching, which is a strong indication, on the rear passenger door.
Trooper Bowles then conducted a search of the vehicle and located two
bags of marijuana by the rear passenger door.
21.

Trooper Bowles has received extensive training in drug

interdiction techniques.

He is an award-winning member of the Utah

Highway Patrol drug interdiction squad.

He regularly consults and

contributes to drug interdiction databases. He has personally made
approximately 9,000 to 10,000 traffic stops resulting in around 500
drug arrests, which includes over one hundred interdictions, or
11

loads " , of drugs.
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

!•

This was a lawful traffic stop because the officer

observed a traffic violation.

It is fundamental, black-letter constitutional law that
reasonable suspicion is required to stop a motor vehicle.

Reasonable

suspicion for a traffic stop includes a traffic violation committed in
the presence of a police officer.

Among the situations that courts have
identified where a police officer is justified in
stopping a vehicle are: (1) when the officer
observes the driver commit a traffic violation;
(2) when the officer has a reasonable articulable
suspicion that the driver is committing a traffic
offense . ..; and (3) when the officer has a
reasonable articulable* suspicion that the driver
is engaged in more serious criminal activity,
such as transporting drugs.
State v. Lopez,

831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 1992}.

Trooper Bowles was monitoring eastbound traffic on a freeway
with a UDOT crew on the other side of the freeway.

It is beyond

dispute that the shoulder of a freeway is a dangerous place to be.
Indeed, that is the reason for laws designed to protect people stopped
on the freeway from passing motorists such as the following statute at
issue in this case:
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41-6a-904. Approaching emergency vehicle - Necessarysignals ~ Stationary emergency vehicle ~ Duties of respective
operators•
(3) The operator of a vehicle, upon approaching a
stationary tow truck or highway maintenance vehicle that is
displaying flashing amber lights, shall:
(a) reduce the speed of the vehicle; and
(b) provide as much space as practical to the
stationary tow truck or highway maintenance vehicle.

Based upon the requirements of this law, the Defendant's
vehicle committed a traffic violation in the presence of a police
officer.

Trooper Bowles is watching eastbound traffic merge onto the

freeway from the Salina on-ramp.

There is no other traffic except for

the Defendant and a semi truck in front of the Defendant.

Both

vehicles have merged onto the freeway in a traffic lane with n o lane
markers, signs or other vehicles impeding their travel.

There are

four UDOT vehicles on the side of the road with flashing lights,
within feet of the travel lane.

It is broad daylight, approximately

9:30 in the morning.
Despite all of these circumstances, the Defendant's vehicle
did not slow down, move over or change lanes.

Any or all of these

evasive maneuvers could have been taken at the time because there was
nothing preventing movement or slowing of the Defendant's vehicle.
The officer, who was in the best position to observe the situation,
testified that it was unsafe for the Defendant's vehicle to travel so
close to the UDOT workers.

He concluded that it was a violation of

Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6a-904(3) when the Defendant's vehicle
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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did not slow down, move over in the lane or change lanes. According
to the plain language of the statute, it was a violation of Utah state
law and justifies the traffic stop of Defendant's vehicle,

2•

Reasonable suspicion to detain defendant developed

during the traffic stop.

A central and dispositive issue in this case is whether the
officer had reason to continue the detention after the traffic stop
was completed.

Investigative questioning that further detains
the driver must be supported by reasonable
suspicion of more serious criminal activity.
Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on
specific, articulable facts drawn from the
totality of circumstances facing the officer at
the time of the stop.
State

v. Lopez,

873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994}(emphasis added).

As a "totality of the circumstances" test, the Court must
consider all elements that the officer considered suspicious and
determine whether they, as a whole, amount to reasonable suspicion.
Most importantly, the Court must weigh the facts with "deference to an
officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious
actions."

United

States

v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 946 (10th Cir. 1997).

This is important because a great deal of time and money is spent
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training police officers to detect crime in seemingly innocent
scenarios.

Even the United States Supreme Court has sanctioned

deference to police officers.

When discussing how reviewing courts should make
reasonable suspicion determinations, we have said
repeatedly that they must look at the "totality
of circumstances" of each case to see whether the
detaining officer has a "particularized and
objective basis" for suspecting legal wrongdoing.
. This process allows officers to draw on their own
experience and specialized training to make
inferences from and deductions about the
cumulative information available to them that
might well, elude an untrained person•
United States

v. Arvizu,

534 U.S. 266, 273, (2002) (emphasis added) .

This Court should do the same by analyzing the totality of
circumstances the officer relied upon to detain and question the
Defendant.

It is true that any one of the following factors standing

alone would be insufficient to justify a detention because they are
also consistent with innocent behavior.

However, when they are

combined into one large picture confronting a police officer, they
make him suspicious of other criminal activity.

Consider the

following factors combined into one suspicious episode:

1.
2.
3.

Excessive amount of baggage/luggage.
Unusual, extreme nervousness of occupants and frantic
search for papers.
Defendant's attempt to divert or move officer away
from open vehicle window by getting out of vehicle.
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4.
£.
6.

Licenses and registration from various states.
Implausible time frame of driver's travel history.
Conflicting statements between driver and passenger as
to:
a) where they stayed;
b) how long they stayed; and
c) what state they visited.
Driver's hesitancy in confirming Defendant's version
of events about going to California.
Defendant's prior history of drug offenses.
Travel to and from known drug sources.

7.
8.
9.

As the traffic stop progresses, the officer gathers these
factors of suspicion from his observations and questions.

He does not

unnecessarily prolong the stop nor does he do anything improper in his
investigation.

As he issues the warning, he makes a calculation to

determine if there is enough suspicion to continue the detention.
This is exactly what the courts have required:

[T]he evidence thus collected must be seen
and weighed not in terms of library analysis by
scholars, but as understood by those versed in
the field of law enforcement. Trained officers
aware of modes and patterns of operation of
certain kinds of lawbreakers can draw inferences
and made deductions that might well elude
untrained persons.
United

States

v. Mendez,

118 F.3d 1426, 1431 (10th Cir. 1997)

We do not expect a trained and conscientious police officer
to ignore all of these indicators of criminal activity.
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suspicion is more than a mere hunch.

It is the cumulative effect of a

collection of individual facts that combine to create suspicion.

When

an officer has reasonably made that evaluation, he is justified in
detaining and investigating further. Trooper Bowles was correct in
his assessment that these nine different factors constitute reasonable
suspicion and therefore his actions to detain and question were legal.

3 - A canine sniff is constitutional and constitutes
probable cause to search a vehicle without a warrant.

It has been over twenty-five years since the United States
Supreme Court upheld searches by trained narcotics dogs.-

[W]e conclude that the particular course of
investigation that the agents intended to pursue
here - exposure of respondents' luggage which was
located in a public place, to a trained canine did not constitute a "search" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.
United

States

v. Place,

462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).

The basis for this ruling is that if a person is otherwise
lawfully detained, the canine sniff is simply not intrusive.

In 2005,

the Court extended the ruling to vehicles stopped by police because
the same reasoning applies.

A dog sniff conducted during a concededly
lawful traffic stop that reveals no information
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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other than the location of a substance that no
individual has any right to possess does not
violate the Fourth Amendment.
Illinois

v. Caballes,

543 U.S. 1, 5 (2005).

Since a canine sniff is not a search, the fact that Trooper
Bowles deployed his narcotics dog on the vehicle is not unlawful so
long as the Defendant was being lawfully detained.

This is the reason

that the foregoing analysis of reasonable suspicion to detain was
critical to this case.

Because Trooper Bowles had reasonable

suspicion that more serious criminal activity was afoot, he was
legally justified in detaining the Defendant until that suspicion
could be dispelled.

The quickest, most effective and, as set forth

above, legal means to do so, was running a canine around the vehicle.
Moreover, the courts have repeatedly held that a drug dog
alert is probable cause to conduct an actual search of a vehicle and
its compartments.
required.

Because of the automobile exception, no warrant is

This body of law was summarized succinctly by the Tenth

Circuit Court:

Once, the dog "keyed", the police had
probable cause to believe the automobile
contained narcotics. Thereafter, the search of
Stone's car and the duffel bag in which the
narcotics were found was justified by the
"automobile exceptionn to the search warrant
requirement. The automobile exception justifies
a police search of an automobile traveling on the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

GO
U3
Q

Page 13—Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Suppress
State of Utah vs. Ramon A. Juma

highway, including all containers therein, upon
probable cause to believe it contains contraband.
v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 364 (10th Cir. 1989).

United States

This is a straight-forward case of fundamental Fourth
Amendment law.
violation.

The Defendant's vehicle was stopped for a traffic

During the stop, the officer observed reasonable suspicion

of drug trafficking.

After the traffic violation was completed and

consent to search was denied, Trooper Bowles exercised his discretion
to detain the Defendant and conduct a canine sniff of the exterior of
the vehicle.

The dog, a certified narcotics canine, indicated on the

vehicle and the trooper searched the vehicle pursuant to the
automobile warrant exception.

The Defendant has identified no

constitutional violation.

4„

Defendant has not shown a Brady violation.

The Defendant "urges" this Court to disregard fifty years of
jurisprudence and penalize the State for the inadvertent,
unintentional failure to record a few minutes of conversation.

There

is no prior precedent for such a proposition and the Defendant
provides none nor even a good faith argument to extend existing case
law.

The Defendant has failed to carry any of the burden of proof or

persuasion.

His Motion should be denied.
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5»

There is no doctrine of "dissipation o£ reasonable

suspicion."

The Defendant argues that a "police detention is no longer
justified after reasonable suspicion dissipates."
case for this rule.

He cites the Hansen

But, a careful reading of Hansen shows no such

holding.

Once the purpose of the initial stop is
concluded, however, the person must be allowed to
depart. ,T%Any further temporary detention for
investigative questioning after [fulfilling] the
purpose for the initial traffic stop'"
constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an officer
has probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a
further illegality.
Hansen,

63 P.3d at 660.

The Hansen decision simply reiterates the age-old rule that once the
purpose of the traffic stop has been satisfied, the driver must be
released unless reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity is
observedv.

There is nothing in the case about the dissipation of

reasonable suspicion.

In fact, the idea that reasonable suspicion or

probable cause dissipating is illogical and incomprehensible.

If a

crime has been or is being committed, neither the passage of time nor
circumstances can change the fact that it was committed.

Suspects are

arrested and prosecuted every day for crimes that occur years in the
CD

past.

For the same reasons reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
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does not dissipate.

It may become stale if the Defendant were to

leave the scene, return home, change cars, empty the car, etc.
However, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at the scene of a
traffic stop does not dissipate.

It is either confirmed or dispelled

by further investigation.
The Defendant takes his cue for a "dissipation" theory from
the recent case of State

v. Morris,

214 P.3d 883 (Utah App. 2009) .

The following is the quote:

And Utah law makes clear that any police
detention must be justified by reasonable
suspicion of a crime; police detention is no
longer justified after reasonable suspicion
dissipates. See State v*. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,
Paragraph 31, 63 P.3d 650 (stating that once the
reason for the traffic stop has been resolved,
i.e., reasonable suspicion has dissipated, "[a]ny
further temporary detention ... constitutes an
illegal seizure").
Morris,

214 P.3d at 887.
As is clear from the language of the Court, "dissipated"

means the same thing as "dispelled" or "resolved" as the Court puts
it.

But it has no application to this case. The Defendant is arguing

that reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking dissipated inside the
police car before the officer did anything to dispel or "resolve" it.
Using the Defendant's vernacular, reasonable suspicion in this case
could not "dissipate" until the officer had done something to
. <G
CD
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investigate drug trafficking.

Since he chose to use a canine sniff to

do so, the reasonable suspicion did not "dissipate" until the dog was
finished, and since the dog indicated, thereby creating probable cause
to search, reasonable suspicion did not dissipate.
The Defendant's Motion should be denied in its entirety.
DATED this

j~T

day of November, 2009.

j^v^rZy
•^fr«—"**—
DALE P. EYRE f
Sevier County Attorney
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I h e r e b y certify that a full, true a n d correct copy of t h e
above a n d foregoing MEMORANDUM I N OPPOSITION T O DEFENDANT'S M O T I O N T O
SUPPRESS w a s p l a c e d i n t h e United States mail at Richfield, Utah, w i t h
\~~i

first-class p o s t a g e thereon fully prepaid o n the
November, 20097 addressed as follows:
Mr, Edward D. Flint
Attorney at Law
455 East 400 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
*•
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DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SEVIER COUNTY
895 East 300 North, Richfield, Utah 84701
Telephone: (435) 896-2700; Facsimile: (435) 896-8047

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

vs.
RAMON A. JUMA,
Defendant.

Case No. 091600075
091600076
STATE OF UTAH,
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee
Plaintiff,
vs.
DIAMOND K. FLYNN,
Defendant.

On 11 August 2009, Defendant Juma filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence, On 28 August
2009, Defendant Flynn filed a Notice of Joinder in Motion to Suppress, joining Defendant
Juma's motion. On or about 22 September 2009, Defendant Juma filed Defendant's
Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Evidence Suppression.
Also, On 22 September 2009 the Court conducted an evideiitiary suppression hearing. On
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17 November 2009, the State filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Suppress. On 6 January 2009, Defendant Jurna filed a request to submit for decision.
This motion is now ready for a decision.
DECISION
Defendants' Motion to Suppress Evidence should be denied.
FINDINGS OF FACT
L

On 31 March 2009, at approximately 9:30 a.m., Trooper Ni6k Bowles, with the Utah
Highway Patrol was conducting traffic patrol on Interstate % near Salina, Utah,

2.

Trooper Bowles was in the median near mile post 58, approximately one quarter-mile
east of the Salina on-ramp.

3.

Trooper Bowles observed a black, four-door Chevrolet sedaft enter the freeway behind a
semi-trailer going eastbound* Both the semi and the black Chevrolet remained in the right
(outside) lane as they passed several Utah Department of Transportation maintenance
vehicles on the side of the road. The left (inside) lane was unoccupied.

4.

Trooper Bowles did not see either vehicle move over in their lane or even crowd the
center line.

5.

The UDOT crew was on the south side of the freeway approximately a quarter mile past
the on ramp. The UDOT crew appeared to be replacing a rMdside sign. There were
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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several vehicles on the gravel shoulder and one was up on the shoulder, partially on the
pavement. Trooper Bowles felt it was dangerous to the safety of the UDOT workers for
the black Chevrolet not to move over as it passed. At that point, Trooper Bowles decided
to stop the black Chevrolet vehicle.
6.

At both the preliminary hearing and the suppression hearing Trooper Bowles testified he
stopped the black Chevrolet for failure to move over for ati emergency vehicle.

7.

Defendant Juma was in the front passenger seat of the black Chevrolet, which he had
rented, and Defendant Flynn was driving.

8.

As Trooper Bowles approached the black Chevrolet vehicle, he could see there were only
two occupants. The luggage compartment of the vehicle was visible as the trooper
approached and he immediately noticed that the entire rear portion of the vehicle was
filled with luggage. In Trooper Bowles5 experience, the amount of luggage in the vehicle
was excessive for two people.

9.

Trooper Bowles made contact with Defendants who seemed unusually nervous and even
frantic. Their hands were shaking as they retrieved their identifying documents and
handed them to the trooper.

10.

Trooper Bowles obtained identification for both Defendants which showed the driver,
Flynn, was from Michigan and the passenger, Juma, was from Kansas. The vehicle was a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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rental and had been rented in Nebraska. Trooper Bowles testified that in his training and
experience it is common in drug trafficking situations for tlii participants and vehicles to
all be from different states.
11.

Trooper Bowles then spoke with both defendants separately* Their stories about their
travel together did not match and this caused Trooper Bowles further concern.

12.

At about this time, Trooper Bowles received infonnation from dispatch indicating
Defendant Juma had a previous criminal history involving drugs.

13.

Trooper Bowles then gave Flynn a written warning notice, returned her identification
card and then, as she started to leave, Trooper Bowles asked if he could talk to her a little
more. Flynn agreed to speak to Trooper Bowles.

14.

Trooper Bowles told Flynn about the things he had noticed during the course of the stop
that caused him to suspect drugs. He asked if he could search the vehicle. Flynn told
Trooper Bowles he would have to speak to Mr. Juma because he was the person who
rented the vehicle. Trooper Bowles then asked Juma for permission to search and Juma
refused.

15.

At this point, Trooper Bowles decided to deploy his trained canine. At the time, Trooper
Bowles was a certified canine handler. The dog was also a trained and certified drug
CO

detection dog. As Trooper Bowles took the dog around Defendants' vehicle, the dog
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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alerted, indicating drugs in the rear of the vehicle, and at the right, rear bumper, then the
dog more aggressively indicated the presence of drugs by barking and scratching on the
rear passenger door of the vehicle.
16.

Based on this indication by the canine, Trooper Bowles decided to search the vehicle
where he discovered marijuana on thefloorboard,near the fear passenger door, and in the
rear of the vehicle.
ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated .. ."UnitedStates v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,550 (U.S. 1980).
The Court first considers whether there was a seizure and subsequent search. The Court
concludes there was a seizure because stopping an automobile and the resulting detention is a
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. State v.
Steward, 806 P.2d 213,215 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155,157-158 (Utah Ct. App.
1992), held, "the stopping of an automobile is constitutionally justified if the stop is incident to a
lawful citation for a traffic violation." The central issue in this motion is whether Trooper
Bowles had a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Defendants' vehicle.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Defendants argue Trooper Bowles did not have reasonable suspicion to stop them.
Trooper Bowles stopped their vehicle because it failed to move ovef and change lanes while
approaching and passing the UDOT crew on the eastbound right shoulder of Interstate 70.
Defendants argue there is no requirement for the driver of a vehicle to change lanes when
passing a highway maintenance vehicle.
The State argues that Defendants' vehicle did not slow down, move over, or change lanes
and thus Defendant Flynn violated Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6a*904(3), and created a
dangerous situation for the UDOT crews. However, Trooper Bowies testified at both the
Preliminary Hearing and the Evidentiary Hearing that he stopped f)efendants because they failed
to move over to the left lane for an emergency vehicle.1 The UDOT vehicles with their amber
colored lights flashing are not "authorized emergency vehicles."2 The UDOT vehicles with their
amber lights flashing are governed by Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6a-904(3) which states: "The
operator of a vehicle, upon approaching a stationary tow truck or highway maintenance vehicle
that is displaying flashing amber lights, shall: (a) reduce the speed of the vehicle; and (b) provide

1

Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6a-904(2) states: "The operator of a vehicle, upon approaching a stationary
authorized emergency vehicle that is displaying alternately flashing red, red and white, or red and blue lights, shall:
... (c) if traveling in a lane adjacent to the stationary authorized emergency vehicle and if practical, with due regard
to safety and traffic conditions, make a lane change into a lane not adjacent to the authorized emergency vehicle.

O
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6a-102 defines "Authorized emergency vehicle" as fire department vehicles;
police vehicles; ambulances; and other publicly or privately owned vehicles designated by the commissioner of the
Department of Public Safety.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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as much space as practical to the stationary tow truck or highway maintenance vehicle/'
In this case, the CourtfindsTrooper Bowles made a good faith mistake. He testified that
he stopped Defendants' vehicle for failure to move over for an emergency vehicle. He
mistakenly thought there had been a violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6a-904(2).
However, the UDOT vehicles are not "authorized emergency vehicles." Therefore, Section 416a-904(3) applies in this case. Section 41-6a~904(3) does not requite motorists to change lanes
when approaching and passing highway maintenance vehicles. Rather, motorists are only
required to reduce speed and provide space for the maintenance vehicle.
In a similar case, State v. Applegate, 194 P.3d 925, 931 (Utah 2008), the Utah Supreme
Court held, "[an officer's] subjective understanding of the law is irrelevant. Instead, all that
matters is that [the officer is] able to point to specific and articulable facts regarding [a suspect's]
conduct which, taken together with rational inferences, created a reasonable suspicion of a
violation of the traffic laws/' See also, State v. Friesen, 988 P.2d 7 (Ut App 1999).
In this case, the Court finds that though Trooper Bowles obviously made a mistake about
the specific traffic law involved, he still had a reasonable articulable suspicion Defendants had
committed a traffic violation. Trooper Bowles knew Defendant Flynn failed to move over when
approaching and passing the UDOT crew. Trooper Bowles testified he believed this created a
dangerous condition and constituted a violation of traffic laws sufficient to make a stop.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In other words, the Courtfindsno evidence to suggest Trooper Bowles stopped
Defendants for a contrived or improper purpose. Instead, he had a reasonable articulable
suspicion that Defendants had violated a traffic law. His subjective understanding (or
misunderstanding) of the law is irrelevant. Therefore, the Court finds the initial stop and
detention of Defendants in this case was lawful.
The next issue in this case is whether die continued detention and questioning of
Defendants after termination of the initial traffic stop was justified by additional reasonable
suspicion. After carefully considering all the evidence, the Court concludes Trooper Bowles had
reasonable articulable suspicion of more serious criminal activity.
Though many of the traditional factors which typically lead to a finding of reasonable
suspicion, such as unusual odor, vehicle alterations or physical indications of impairment, are
absent in this case, the Court finds the following articulated facts sufficient to establish
reasonable suspicion in the totality of the circumstances: (1) Defendants were both from
different states and the car was rented in a third state; (2) there was an inordinate amount of
luggage for two people; (3) Defendants were both unusually nervous; (4) Defendants' stories
about the course and timetable of their travel did not match; and (5) dispatch reported Defendant
Juma had a criminal history which included drug offenses.
None of these factors, on their own, is enough for reasonable suspicion. However,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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viewing them in the totality of the circumstances facing Trooper Bowles at the time of the stop,
the Court finds they are enough to justify further detention to ask about drugs and to seek
permission to search the vehicle. The Court finds the resulting detention reasonably related in
scope to the initial detention. At that point, the Court finds Trooper Bowles also had reasonable
suspicion to deploy his narcotics dog to sniff the exterior of the vehicle.
The Court finds the additional detention was not unduly l&igthy or unreasonable, nor did
it occur at an unreasonable place or time. After the dog indicated the presence of drugs, the
Court finds Trooper Bowles had probable cause not only to continue and expand the detention,
but to search the vehicle without a warrant.
It is well settled that exposure to a trained canine does not constitute a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it does not expose non-contraband items that would
otherwise be hidden from public view. United State v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,707 (U.S. 1983);
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,409 (U.S. 2005). However, once a narcotics dog indicates the
presence of narcotics, the police have probable cause to conduct a search. United States v. Stone,
866 F.2d 359, 364 (10th Cir. 1989).
Indeed, the Utah Court of Appeals has held "the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement provides that m[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it
contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment... permits police to search the vehicle without
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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more."1 State v, Despain, 173 P.3d 213, 217 (Utah Ct App. 2007), (quoting Maryland v. Dyson,
527 US. 465,467,119 S. Ct. 2013,144 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999).
Therefore, the Court concludes that based upon the strong indication by the canine in this
case, Trooper Bowles had sufficient probable cause to search the vehicle. Accordingly,
Defendants' Motion to Suppress should be denied.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons listed above, Defendant Juma and Defendant Flynn's Motion to Suppress
is denied. The Clerk is directed to set this case for a scheduling conference.
DATED this

Digitally signed by Wallace A. Lee
DN: cn=Walface A. Lee, c=US, o-Sixth District Court,
.utcourts.gov
Reason: I am approving this document
Date: 2010.03.04 15:17:54 -07'00'

Wallace A- LeeSiE^
WALLACE A. LEE, Judge
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SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RAMON A JUMA,
Defendant.

MINUTES
ARRAIGNMENT
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
Case No; 091600075 FS
PAUL D LYMAN
Judge:
June
15, 2010
Date:

PRESENT
Clerk:
carolcf
Prosecutor: DALE P EYRE
CASEY W JEWKES •
Defendant
Defendants Attorney{s) : EDWARD D FLINT
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: March 8, 1972
Audio
Tape Number:
NCR
Tape Count: 931-944
CHARGES
1. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree FelonyPlea: Guilty - Disposition: 06/15/2010 Guilty
ARRAIGNMENT
The Information is read.
Advised of rights and penalties. •
Defendant is arraigned/
Defendant waives right to a trial by jury,
HEARING
TAPE: NCR
COUNT: 931Mr Flint advised the Court he will be filing an appeal on Judge
Lee's denial of Flint's motion to suppress. Def will enter a guilty
plea today to count 1 in return for the State1s dismissal of count
2. This plea will be conditionally.
Mr Eyre states since Def is entering his plea conditionally, that
the bail bond previously posted will be exonerated. In lieu of
serving jail time, Def will need to pay a new bail bond, surrender
his passport, and not travel outside of the
United States. Def has signed a waiver of rights form. Def states
he is prepared to contact a bail bondsman today.
•' *;
The Court accepts the stipulated agreement between parties and
notes Mr Flint will file his appeal today. Def is released upon the
posting of $10,000 bond. Def is to surrender his passport within
the next 2 weeks to Mr Eyre.
in
Def is not to leave the United States. Def is not to violate any Oo
CD
laws.
to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Case No: 091600075 Date:

Jun 15, 2010

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST
C/SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
SENTENCE JAIL SUSPENDED NOTE
All jail time is suspended upon posting of a new $10,000 bond.
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1
Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$9283.00
$9283.00
$
$9283.00
$9283.00
$0
$0
Plus Interest
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Edward D.Flint 4573
Jonathon W. Grimes 10462
Sean Hullinger 09264
Attorneys for Defendant
455 East 400 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5297
Fax: (801) 532-2063
Email: ed@utahaccesslegal.com
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SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH

1

SEVIER COUNTY, RICHFIELD DEPARTMENT
STATE.OF UTAH,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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RAMONAJUMA,

Case No. 091600075
Defendant.

Hon. Wallace A. Lee
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COMES NOW, Defendant Ramon A. Juma, through Counsel Edward D. Flint, and,
pursuant to Rule 3(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby appeals the judgment of
the Sixth Judicial District Court in Richfield, Sevier County, the Honorable Judge Wallace A.
Lee.
Defendant appeals the final order of the above-mentioned Court denying Defendant's
Motion to Suppress Evidence to the Utah Supreme Court/Utah Court of Appeals; and
Defendant's conditional guilty plea to Count 1 of the Information: to wit, possession of
marijuana of more than one pound and less than a hundred pounds with intent to distribute, a
third degree felony, in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8(l')(a)(iii), to the Utah Supreme Court/Utah
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Court of Appeals.
DATED this 14th day of June, 2010.

Edward D. Flint
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Edward D. Flint 4573
Jonathon W. Grimes 10462
ACCESS LEGAL
Attorneys for Defendant
455 East 400 South, Suite 100 .
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-363-5297
Facsimile: 801-532-2063
Email: ed@,utahaccesslegal.com

S'XTH DISTRICT COURT

WJUMI5 PrU-'lt

SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SEVIER COUNTY, RICHFIELD DEPARTMENT

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
STAY THE EXECUTION OF
SENTENCE, PENDING APPEAL

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RAMONA.JUMA,

Case No.: 091600075

Defendant.

Judge Wallace A. Lee

COMES NOW the Defendant, Ramon A. Juma, through counsel of record,
Edward D. Flint, and hereby MOVES this Court, pursuant to Rule 27, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, for an Order Staying execution of the Sentence and Commitment in
the case pending appeal, and states:
Defendant has filed a Notice of Appeal and Application for a Certificate of
Probable Cause in the District Court contemporaneously with this Motion:
Defendant is entitled to have this Court issue a Certificate of Probable Cause that
the defendant is not likely to flee or fail to appear as required, during the pendency of the
appeal and that defendant does not pose a danger to the safety of any other person in the
Defendant's Motion to Stay the Execution of Sentence
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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community, and should be released under conditions imposed by the Court pursuant to
Rule 27 (g), U.R. Cr.P.
DATED this

day of June, 2010.

Edward D. Flint

tsj
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
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Case No. 091600075
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PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT
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Deposition of Preliminary Hearing Transcript

1

A.

B-O-W-L-E-S.

2
3

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Eyre, you

may proceed when you are ready, Sir.

4

MR. EYRE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

5

DIRECT EXAMINATION

6

BY-MR.EYRE:

7

Q.

8

08/11/09

*

Sgt, Bowles, were you on duty on March

31 st of this year?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Were you involved in the investigation

11

of the defendants Juma and Flynn?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

What caused you to come into contact

14
15

withthesepeople?
A.

As I was sitting stationary in the

16

Interstate 70 median near milepost about 58, I

17

observed a vehicle traveling in the outside lane.

18

There were some UDOT workers on the side of the

19

road fixing a sign, basically right close to where

20

I was.

21

The vehicle passed their location without moving

22

over for the UDOT workers, so I stopped the

23

vehicle.

They did have their overhead lights on.

24

Q.

Did they stop immediately?

25

A.

That I recall, yes.
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Deposition of Preliminary Hearing Transcript

1
2

Q.

08/11/09

Okay, what did you notice upon your

approach to the vehicle?

3

A.

I noticed a very large amount of luggage

4

inside the vehicle. As I interacted with the

5

occupants, they seemed to be very nervous, kind of

6

rushing to get their documents.

7

got from them was that they was trying to get me

8

away from the vehicle.

9

Q.

The feeling that I

You mentioned they are nervous, more

10

than usual?

11

A.

Yes, very much, so.

12

Q.

What other observations did you notice

13

about them, their body movements, anything that

14

showed nervousness?

15

A.

Trembling hands, and then again, it

16

seemed to me that they were very rushed in trying

17

to provide documents to me.

18

they were frantic trying to find the documents.

It almost seemed like

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

Ms. Flynn.

21

Q.

And did she provide any documentation to

A.

She provided a Michigan identification

22
23

Who was driving the vehicle?

you?

24

card.

25

license.

She informed me that she did not have a
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1
2

Q.

08/11/09.

And Mr. Juma was a passenger in the

vehicle ?

3

A.

Correct..

4

Q.

Did he provide any documentation?

5

A.

Yes, he did.

6

Q.

What did he provide?

7

A.

He provided a Kansas driver's license,

8

along with the rental contract for the vehicle.

9

Q.

10

the vehicle?

Okay.

Did you determine who had rented

11

A.

Mr. Juma had.

12

Q.

Okay.

13
14
15
16
17

^

After obtaining this

documentation, what did you do next?
A.

I returned to my vehicle and asked Ms.

Flynn to come back with me.
Q.

Okay.

Did you speak with her while you

were in your vehicle?

18

A.

Yes, I did.

19

Q.

What did you talk about?

20

A.

Their travels* her association with Mr.

21
22
23

Juma •
Q.

At any point, did you make any contact

with Mr. Juma?

24

A.

Yes, I did.

25

Q.

Did you have any discussions with him?
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16
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17

Q.

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

What

20

A•

He

Ye?

d i d he s a y ?
I

. .

I c: i I ' Ic: r e c a ] 3 11: I e e x a c t

21

b a s i c a 11 y II e d e n i e d m e c o ii s e n t

22

v eh I cle»

23

Q.

Oka M ,

24

A,

l

25

to

veh1c] e?

8

14

9
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about
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exterior of the vehicle.
Q.

Okay.

A.

I was at the time.

Q.

Okay, and did you deploy your dog?

A.

Yes.

Q.

The dog was with you in your car?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay, and what happened after the dog

Are you a canine officer?

>

was deployed?
.A,

When I deployed the dog on the outside

of the vehicle, he alerted to the odor of narcotics
and gave an indication of the rear passenger door.
Q.

Okayr with that indication, what did you

A.

I conducted a search of the vehicle.

Q,

What did you find in the vehicle?

A."

I found three different bags containing

do?

marijuana, total weights about 33 pounds.

There

was one bag on the floor board by the rear door
that my canine had indicated on.

There were also

two bags in the rear of the vehicle.
Q.

Why do you believe 33 pounds of

marijuana is intent to distribute marijuana?
A.
arrests.

Through my career, I have had many drug
Typical amounts for a-user amount would

[ p THACKERJCO
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18
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19
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Yes.

20
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22
23
24
25
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16

21
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1

Q.

Okay.

08/11/09-

Can you start with that last

2

comment about the identification of the contraband?

3

You said that you identified the three bags as

4

having marijuana based upon their appearance and

5

smell?

6

A.

Correct.

7

Q.

Have they been tested otherwise to

8

determine?

9

A.

10

yet or not.

11

Q.

12

I'm not sure if they have been submitted

Okay.

The cocaine, were you involved in

determining that was cocaine?

13

A.

Yes, the nic test.

14

Q.

Did you do a field test on that?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Okay, now you weren't there when that

17

was found on Mr. Juma?

18

A.

No, I was not.

19

Q.

Okay.

Let's go back in time to where

20

you first spotted the vehicle.

21

on an on ramp?

22
23

13

A.

They were getting

They were coming.from--They had actually

come from the on ramp onto the interstate.

24

Q.

Did you see them coming up the on ramp?

25

A.

Yeah.

COURT

RiPORTIRS^-

LLC

50 West
Broadway,
Suite
Salt
Lake City,
Utah
84101
Digitized
by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law900,
Library,
J. Reuben
Clark Law
School,
BYU.
801-983-2180
Toll Free:OCR,
877-441-2180
Fax:801-983-2181
Machine-generated
may contain errors.

Deposition

of

treiiniinary

Q.

(

Hearing T r a n s c r i p t

• T!

J"

'. 0 8 / 1 1 / 0 9

14

'*

1:

3

Q

4

I

5

Q,

.a

eastbour'?

" r c v we

. •.

yc n i c o n ] ci tie J 1 t h e y

were

comi n g u p

i

6

the

on ramp

7

I

8

Q .

9

P.

10

Q

11

A

12

Q.

13

freeway

14
15

A

of

truck

18

so-

} C ••:

I: : • =!: s e rti i

r n n i -

11: i i c k g : > :i i 1 g s 3 o w 3 y

; ^ c ex 1 3 * 1 1 s s p e e d .
Wee;: d y o u s a y i t
spe

w a s s u c s t a n i a 11 y b e 1 o \ i

?

i

^

V ^ ^ v H

': r> -. '

+* r\

• r . L. ;.

a a ^ / ' h ' K o ' K P

t

.\

.

" - --a

v i. y: i: e L l >

„"-i !

:
i -

r? u 1 1 . . •

19

A.

20

Q.

what ?

22

A.

23

Q,

24

1

Q.

17

21

e o n ] i — +* f

semi s

16

i

., ^

I

{

\* .

A.

~ v_ v. a

. rj _

w. . . .

-, t

,-L

i

d^K C r e v r c i e 1 " ,

*_ e ? A T m ' - f r n c k

is

l". w a s

1

" v - c13 ;y b e 1 I i n c i

11: ie

Yes.

R E P O R T

E R S ^^-—

- 1 1. C

Digitized 50
by the
Howard
W. Hunter Law
Library,
Reuben
ClarkCity,
Law School,
West
Broadway,
Suite
900,J.Salt
Lake
Utah BYU.
84101
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Ti >1I Free: 877-441-2180

was

• ^rrect?

• ' r a i "e1

C O U R T

801 983-2180

t r -J

Yer.

t r u c k p u 1 1 - ':

25

(J i

- Fax.: 801-9SJ ^ >;

s = in i -

Deposition of Preliminary Hearing Transcript

08/11/09

1

Q.

It didn't try to pass the truck?

2

A.

It eventually did once it passed my

3
4
5

location, but at that time, no, it did not.
Q.

Okay, but while it was on the on ramp,

you saw it directly behind the semi-trailer?

6

A.

As it was coming up the- on ramp, yes.

7

Q.

Okay, where was the UDOT crew?

8

A.

On the--would be the south side of the

9
10

highway.
Q.

11

ramp?

1

ramp?

2

And where, in relationship to the on
Weren't they right at the top of the on

13

A.

I would say a quarter mile passed it.

14

Q.

Just passed the on ramp?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q-

A quarter mile, that would be 1,000,

17

1,200 feet?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Okay, and were they parked on the

20

pavement, or on the shoulder on.the dirt or grassy

21

area?

22

A.

Well, there were.several vehicles there.

23

I think a couple of them were down in the grass.

24

I believe one of them was up on the shoulder.

25

15

Q.

Okay, and by shoulder, do you mean the

a 1 ii
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1
2

Q.

Orange lights.

08/11/09

Did any of them have

red lights, like you have on your patrol car?

3

A.

Not that I'm aware of, no.

4

Q.

Did any of them have blue lights, like

5

you have on your patrol car?
v

6

A.

No.

7

Q.

Were any of them flashing white lights?

8

A.

Not that I know of.

9

Q.

You didn't see any red and white in

10
11

combination or red and blue in combination?
A.

As far as I recall, it was all the
*

12
13

orange lights that UDOT typically has..
Q,

Standard lights that you would flash as

14

your emergency lights on an automobile, for that

15

matter?

16

"'A.

I don't know of too many automobiles

17

that have the orange lights on top of their

18

vehicles.

19
20
21

Q.

Now, were these the rotating lights, or

just flashing lights?
A.

I believe t h e y — I don't know what kind

22

they have.

23

their vehicles.

24

don 7 t know.

25

Q.

They have the light bars on top of

Okay.

Whether they rotate or flash, I

I always get confused with the
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1
2
3

Q.

license plates on it?
A.

No, it's because I'm not a commercial

vehicle officer.

5

vehicles.

7

Q.

I typically deal with passenger

But it's the same violation, though,

isn't it?

8

A.

Yes, it is.

9

Q.

Okay, same citation, same violation?

10

A.

Yes, but I'm much more familiar with

11
12

19

Is that because you saw out of state

4

6

08/11/09

passenger vehicles.
Q.

t

Do you know of another law enforcement

13

vehicle that was parked at the bottom of that on

14

ramp?

15

A.

No, I do not.

16

Q.

"Were you in radio communication with any

17

other officers prior to observing the black

18

Chevrolet?

19
20
21

A.

I'm always--I always have that

capability, but I had not spoken with anybody, no.
Q.

In the minute or two before seeing the.

22

black Chevrolet,- did you have any radio contact

23

with another patrol car?

24

A.

No.

25

Q.

Did a n o t h e r o f f i c e r

u
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did not have a
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seat?
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1

08/11/09

outside of the vehicle are not recorded?

2

A.

Correct,

3

Q.

Alright.

Now, in fact, after having

4

received the information that there were no

5

warrants or wants for either of these individuals,
s

6

that the rental company had not reported the car

7
stolen or missing, you decided to give Ms* Flynn a

8
9
10

warning citation, is that correct?
A.
Correct,
Q.

In fact, in your report, you say that

11

the very first thing you told her when you asked

12

her to come back to your patrol vehicle was that

13

you told her you were going to give her a warning

14

citation for the violation, is that correct?

15

A.

Once we were inside of my vehicle, yes.

16

Q.

Okay, so that was your intent from the

17

very beginning, was to give her a w a r n i n g —

18

A,

Yes.

19

Q.

--as long as they both checked out and

20

didn't have any warrants?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Okay,

Now, they don't have any

23

warrants.

24

a warning citation?

25

A.

The car is not stolen.

You do give her

Yes.
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1

Q.

She spoke with you a little bit further?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

You asked her if she had any weapons or

4

illegal items in the vehicle?

5

A.

Yes .

6

Q.

Specifically asked if there was any

7

narcotics in the vehicle or illegal drugs?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

She said no.

10

A.

Yeah.

11

Q.

Okay, then you, asked her if you could

12

search?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

She said it's not for her to decide

15

It was Mr. Junta's rental vehicle?

16

A.

Something to that effect, yes.

17

Q.

Okay, then you asked Mr. Juma the same

18

questions.

19

in the car, and he said no?

Are there any weapons or illegal items

20

A.

Correct.

21

Q.

You asked him, specifically, are there

22

any narcotics or illegal drugs, and he said no?

23

A.

24

Q,

25

.

Correct.
And you asked him if you could search

the vehicle, and he said no?

•

jfln! THACKER*CO
I

fcir-i

COURT

REPORTERS ^

LLC

MOTWWfebttnit.

50the
West
Broadway,
Suite
900,J. Salt
Lake
UtahBYU.
84101
Digitized by
Howard
W. Hunter Law
Library,
Reuben
ClarkCity,
Law School,
Machine-generated
OCR, may
contain errors.
801-983-2180
Toll Free:
877-441-2180
Fax:801-983-2181

28

Deposition of Preliminary Hearing Transcript

1

A.

Correct.

2

Q.

Okay, then you got the dog

3

A,

Yes .

4

Q.

29

08/11/09
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1

Q.

09/22/09

And of those arrests, how many contained

2

amounts that you considered intent to distribute or

3

trafficking loads?

4

A.

5

100 actual.

6

a load of narcotics, I would say roughly 70. •

7

Q.

Intent to distribute, I would say over
What we consider to be a pipeline or

Okay.

Now, at the time of the

8

preliminary hearing, you indicated that you had

9

stopped the vehicle for failing to yield to an

10

emergency vehicle, is that correct?

11

A.

Failing to move ojver for it, yes.

12

Q.

Alright.

Now, at the time, what were

13

you doing when you first observed the vehicle that

14

you stopped?

15

A.

16
17

Just sitting in the median watching the

traffic.
Q.

Okay.

Were you pointed and facing the

18

direction that the car you stopped was traveling,

19

so it was coming toward you?

20

A.

21

towards me.

22

was eastbound.

23
24
25

Q.

I was facing it as it was coming
So I was facing west.

The vehicle

Now, this emergency vehicle was a UDOT

vehicle, right?
A.

Yes, several of them.
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1

Q.

2

vehicles.

3

from you?

4
5

A.

Okay.

09/22/09

Describe the scene of the UDOT

First of all, how far away were they

I would say maybe 20 feet down the road

behind me.

6

Q.

East of your position?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

And describe what you saw with the UDOT

9
10

vehicles.
A.

What's going on there?
Well, there were several that are UDOT

11

pick-up trucks that are tjie white trucks with the

12

orange or yellow lights on the top of them.

13

was--they had one of their loaders there, and it

14

looked to me like they were repairing a sign, one

15

of the big signs that, you know, tells you how far

16

Denver and a couple other locations were.

17
18

Q.

There

One of the traffic signs along the

highway?

19

A.

Yes .

20

Q.

Were these orange or yellow lights on?

21

A.

Yes .

22

Q.

Do you think it was on all the

23

vehicles?

24

A.

That I recall, yes.

25

Q.

Okay.
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09/22/09

1

A.

No.

2

Q.

There's two vehicles, a semi and a

3

passenger car.

4

see ?

5

A.

What do you see?

Describe what you

I observed both vehicles traveling in

6

the outside lane, and they both appear to be

7

picking up speed getting on the freeway.

8

vehicle moved over for the DOT units.

9

them in that right lane.

10
11
12

Neither

Both passed

Both of them had ample

opportunity to move over.
Q.

So you don't recall anyone on the inside

lane?

13

A.

There was none.

14

Q.

Impeding their moving over?

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

What about the speed?

17

Were they slowing

down?

18

A.

Did not appear to be, no.

19

Q.

In your opinion, could they have moved

20

over?

21

A.

Oh, definitely.

22

Q.

Do you recall them moving over to at

23

14

least the center line and crowding the center line?

24

A.

No.

25

Q.

Did you note any evasive action taken by
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1

15

09/22/09

the driver of the car?

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

In your opinion, should they have moved

4

over?

5

A.

I think they should have.

• 6

Q.

Did you feel like it was unsafe?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Did you immediately initiate a stop?

9

A.

Yes.

10

passenger vehicle, I did initiate a stop.

11

Q.

12

immediately?

13

A.

14
15

As soon as I caught up to the

Okay, and did they pull over

That I recall, yes.

I don't remember

any long delay.
Q.

Okay.

Now, at the preliminary hearing,

16

you indicated several things that caught your

17

attention.

18

vehicle ?

The first, excessive luggage in the

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

What kind of vehicle is this?

21

A.

It's a Chevy HHR.

22

Q.

What kind of vehicle is that?

23

A.

It's Chevy's model of a PT Cruiser.

24
25

kind of looks like ah SUV, just smaller.
Q.

14

Does it have a trunk?
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09/22/09

1

asks to do that, and that kind of furthered my

2

suspicion that they wanted me away from the

3

vehicle.

4

from the vehicle to keep, you know, a safe

5

distance-

6
7

By him stepping out, I have to move away

Q.

Did he go to the trunk or the back

portion to get his license?

8

A.

No, he did not,

9

Q.

Okay,

10

Did you obtain identification

from both occupants?

11

A.

Yes, I did,

12

Q.

What did you notice about that?

13

A.

I noticed that they were from pretty

j

14

different areas.

15

me with a Michigan identification card.

16

provided me with a Kansas driver's license.

17
18

Q.

The driver, Ms, Flynn, provided

What about the vehicle?

Mr. Juma

Where was it

registered out of?

19

A.

Nebraska.

20

Q.

And what's significant about these

21
22

people being from different areas of the country?
A.

I found that it's common for drug

23

traffickers to have multiple locations involved

24

with the situation.

25

here, a passenger from here, a car from here.

They will grab a driver from

•i-^sssamm
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1
2

Q.

09/22/09

Was there any question in your mind that

the dog had indicated?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

Why is that?

5

A.

It was a good indication,

6

moving.

7

training, I knew that he was in the overt

8

narcotics, and the fact that he was scratching and

9

barking is a very good indication.

10
11

He went back to me.

Q.

I kept

Throughout my

So he was scratching and barking, so

that's two kinds of indications.

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

The only other one would be biting?

14

A.

Yes, and technically, to be considered

15

an indication, he only needs to do one of those.

16

I mean, if all he had done is stood at that door

17

and barked, I would have considered that an

18

indication.

19

at it, the same thing.

20
21

Q.

If all he would have done is scratched

Alright.

Officer, you have a recording

device in your vehicle?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Was it operating during this stop?

24

A.

Operating, all but the belt mike, yes.

25

Q.

The belt mike, that's the mike that
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1

09/22/09

works outside the vehicle, outside your cruiser?

2

A.

Yes .

3

Q.

And when is it activated?

4

A.

When I turn on my emergency lights.

5

Q.

When is it deactivated?

• 6

A.

When I turn it off.

7

Q.

I'm going to show you as State's Exhibit

8

Number 1.

9
10

A.

v

What is that?
That is a copy of my video from this

stop.

11

Q.

Okay, did you have that made?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

I would like to offer Number 1.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. NEELEY:

16

THE COURT:

Mr. Flint?

17

MR. FLINT:

No objection.

18

THE COURT:

You both agree.

19

Q.

Alright, I have nothing further.

THE COURT:
Mr. Flint?

24
25

State's

Thank

you.

22
23

No objection.

Exhibit 1 is received without objection.

20
21

Any objection, Mr. Neeley?

Thank you.

Mr. Neeley?

Whichever, I'm sorry.•
MR. FLINT:

you don't mind.

Judge, I'll go first, if

I'm going to ask the Court's
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09/22/09

1

A.

Yes .

2

Q.

You didn't observe any traffic

3

violation?

4

A.

Not at that time, no.

5

Q.

Okay, and do you recall your previous

• 6
7

testimony at the preliminary hearing when I asked
you about the UDOT vehicles, is that correct?

8

A.

Yes, I remember you asking about that.

9

Q.

You say there were several UDOT

10

vehicles?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Were they parked on the pavement or on

13

the gravel?

14

A.

t

'

As I testified before, there was one

15

that was partially on the pavement.

16

them were kind of off into the dirt.

17
18

Q-

The rest of

And they had their yellow lights

flashing?

19

A.

Yes .

20

Q.

And none of them had red lights

21

flashing?

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

.None of them had a combination of red

24
25

and white or red and blue lights flashing?
A.

I don't know of any that are equipped
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1

09/22/09

have explained that discrepancy?

2

A.

No.

I don't make it a point to provide

3

each other's stories to them so that they can

4

correct their story.

5

me.

6

totally different.

7

you need to change your story.

8

something different.

9

I mean, it's pretty simple to

One gives me one story, one gives me one

Q.

I'm not going to go say hey,
He's telling

I guess, Sergeant, without beating a

10

dead horse, what I'm getting at here is if they had

11

been actually traveling separately, both of their

12

stories could be correct?

13

A.

If.

14

Q.

Okay.

When you got the dispatch

15

information ba.ck to verify that Mr. Juma had a

16

valid license and no warrant so he could drive the

17

car away, because that was your intent, correct?

18

A.

What's that?

19

Q.

Your intent was to let Mr. Juma drive

20

53

the car away and give Ms. Flynn a warning?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

And dispatch, in .fact, told you Mr. Juma

23

did have a.valid driver's license?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

And that there were no warrants for his
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09/22/09

1

arrest?

2

A.

Correct.

3

Q.

But you also obtained from dispatch,

4

essentially, Mr. Juma's arrest record?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q,

And that arrest record then added

7

additional suspicion?

8

A•

Yes.

9

Q.

Okay, and then ultimately, you received

10

word from dispatch that, in fact, the car was truly

11

correctly rented to Mr. Jyma from an agency in

12

Kansas, just like he said?

13

A•

Yes.

14

Q.

And it was due back?

15

A,

Yes•

16

Q.

Which would mean they would have a lot

17

of driving ahead of them to get it back?

18

A.

Yes, they would,

19

Q.

They might even be late in getting it

20

back and have to pay an extra day's rent?

21

A.

Probably.

22

Q.

Okay, but again, paying an extra day's

23

rent is not all that unusual, is it, for traveling

24

across country?

25

A.

I see it occasionally, yes.
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A.

09/22/09

Q.

Correct.
And you gave her the warning c i t a t i o n ?

A.

Correct.

Q.

And you said, this is just a warning?

A.

Yes .

Q.

Okay, and she thanked you for giving her

a warning
A.

Yes, she did.

Q

Okay, and she opened the door?

-

A.

Yep.

Q.

And she got out of the vehicle.

A.

Yes.

Q.

And she was completely out of the

vehicle and standing on the pavement ready to go
get back in the car?
A.

I believe so, yes.

Q.

And at that point you said, hey, can I

ask you some more questions?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Or something to that effect?

A.

Something to that effect, yes.

Q.

Alright.

In asking those questions,

both she .and Mr. Juma denied having contraband,
denied having weapons?
A.

Yes.
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Suppression Hearing Transcript

09/22/09

1

Q.

2

any search?

3

A.

Correct.

4

Q.

Alright, and then at that point in time,

5

57

And both of them declined to consent to

you deployed the dog?

• 6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

And based upon the dog's indication, you

8

conducted a search?

9

A.

Yes, I did.

10

Q.

Now, once that dog gave you that

11

indication, did you--both Mr. Juma and Ms. Flynn

12

were outside of the vehicle, correct?

13

A.

Correct.

14

Q.

And they were far enough away from the

15

vehicle that they couldn't have destroyed or hidden

16

any evidence?

17

A.

Sure.

18

Q.

Okay, and you could have had back-up

19

there to contain them or detain them?

20

have radioed in and requested that the process

21

start to get a warrant?

You could

22

A.

I could have I guess.

23

Q.

But you specifically chose not to seek a

24
25

warrant?
A.

Yes.
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41-6a-904. Approaching emergency vehicle — Necessary signals — Stationary
emergency vehicle — Duties of respective operators.
(1) Except when otherwise directed by a peace officer, the operator of a vehicle, upon
the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle using audible or visual
signals under Section 41-6a-212 or 41-6a-1625, shall:
(a) yield the right-of-way and immediately move to a position parallel to, and as close
as possible to, the right-hand edge or curb of the highway, clear of any intersection; and
(b) then stop and remain stopped until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed.
(2) The operator of a vehicle, upon approaching a stationary authorized emergency
vehicle that is displaying alternately flashing red, red and white, or red and blue lights,
shall:
(a) reduce the speed of the vehicle;
(b) provide as much space as practical to the stationary authorized emergency vehicle;
and
(c) if traveling in a lane adjacent to the stationary authorized emergency vehicle and if
practical, with due regard to safety and traffic conditions, make a lane change into a lane
not adjacent to the authorized emergency vehicle.
(3) The operator of a vehicle, upon approaching a stationary tow truck or highway
maintenance vehicle that is displaying flashing amber lights, shall:
(a) reduce the speed of the vehicle; and
(b) provide as much space as practical to. the stationary tow truck or highway
maintenance vehicle.
(4) This section does not relieve the operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, tow
truck, or highway maintenance vehicle from the duty to drive with regard for the safety of
all persons using the highway.
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58-37-8. Prohibited acts ~ Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture,
or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange
to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation of
any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37e, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58,
Chapters 37,37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with
five or more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of organizer,
supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled
substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is
guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class
A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree
felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may
be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the trier of
fact finds afirearmas defined in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his
person or in his immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense,
the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (1 )(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree
felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years and
which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the
person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B » Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance
analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order,
directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of the person's professional practice, or
as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
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77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect — Grounds.
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his
actions.
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78A-3-102, Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law
certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments,
and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a j udgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final
judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e)finalorders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions
of the Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative
proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United
States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States
or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appealsfromany court of record involving a charge of a first degree
or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree
felony or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appealsfromthe district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative
subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over
which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of
record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of
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certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall
review
those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63 G, Chapter 4,
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
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78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue
all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resultingfromformal adjudicative proceedings of state
agencies or appealsfromthe district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of
the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources,
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appealsfromthe district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other
local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a charge of afirstdegree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appealsfromorders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or
capital felony;
(h) appealsfromdistrict court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not
limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time,
visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appealsfromthe Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appealsfromthe Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of
the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction,
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4,
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
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